Mickelson v. Padang
Opinion of the Court
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Posner, J.), dated September 12, 1996, which denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.
The plaintiff sought to recover damages for injuries she allegedly sustained in an automobile accident with the defendant. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury as defined by Insurance Law § 5102 (d). The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion, and we reverse. The defendant submitted sufficient evidence to make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff did not suffer a serious injury within the meaning of the statute (see, Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957), thereby shifting the burden to the plaintiff to come forward with sufficient evidence that she sustained a serious injury (see, Gaddy v Eyler, supra; Licari v Elliot, 57 NY2d 230, 235; Lopez v Senatore, 65 NY2d 1017). The plaintiff failed to do so.
In opposition to the defendant’s motion, the plaintiff submitted her own affidavit and the affidavit of Dr. Michael Ebbro,
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.