Mooney v. PCM Development Co.
Cases that cite this one
20 later published cases cite this decision.
- Riffo-Velozo v. Village of Scarsdale (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- Santiago v. County of Suffolk (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2001)
- Morocho v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Central School District (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- Morocho v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Central School District (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- Andresky v. Wenger Construction Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Andresky v. Wenger Construction Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Lopez-Dones v. 601 West Associates, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Lopez-Dones v. 601 West Associates, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Losito v. Manlyn Development Group, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Henry v. Eleventh Avenue, L.P. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Salvagno v. Spano (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- Nimirovski v. Vornado Realty Trust Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2006)
- Rivera v. Rite Lite Ltd. (New York Supreme Court 2006)
- Maplewood, Inc. v. Wood (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- Salmon v. Wendell Terrace Owners Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2004)
- Van Eken v. Consolidated Edison Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
- deSousa v. Dayton T. Brown, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2001)
- Cordero v. Kaiser Organization, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2001)
- Otero v. Cablevision (New York Supreme Court 2000)
- Mooney v. PCM Development Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1998)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., (1) the third-party defendant S & H Interiors appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Barasch, J.), dated January 29, 1996, which granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability under Labor Law § 240 (1), denied its cross motion to dismiss the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action, and granted the branch of the cross motion of the defendants third-party plaintiffs PCM Development Company and Pyramid Companies which was, in effect, for summary judgment on its third-party causes of action for common-law and contractual indemnification against it, and (2) the defendants third-party plaintiffs PCM Development Company and Pyramid Companies separately appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of the same order as granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and denied their cross motion to dismiss the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs payable by the appellants appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
The plaintiffs were entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of liability under Labor Law § 240 (1) (see, LaFleur v Consolidated Edison Co., 221 AD2d 250; Orcutt v American Linen Supply Co., 212 AD2d 979; Iannelli v Olympia & York Battery Park Co., 190 AD2d 775). Contrary to the appellants’ contentions, the plaintiffs established a prima facie case (see, Gordon v Eastern Ry. Supply, 82 NY2d 555, 562). The risk that the scaffold might be struck by another piece of equipment operated in the same area was neither so extraordinary nor so attenuated as to constitute a superseding cause sufficient to relieve PCM/Pyramid of liability (see, Gordon v Eastern Ry. Supply, supra; Kush v City of Buffalo, 59 NY2d 26, 33). Nor, as the appellants contend, was the injury unrelated to an elevation hazard (see, Quinlan v Eastern Refractories Co., 217 AD2d 819).
The Supreme Court also properly rejected the claim that PCM / Pyramid was neither the owner nor the general contractor and therefore not subject to liability under Labor Law § 240 (1) (see, Kenny v Fuller Co., 87 AD2d 183). The failure of PCM/ Pyramid to deny, in its answer, the allegation that it was the general contractor constituted an admission thereof (see, CPLR 3018 [a]). Moreover, not only was PCM/Pyramid the party which contracted with S & H, but the agreement between them provided that all work was subject to the control of PCM/ Pyramid and its agent, that S & H was to perform the work to the satisfaction of PCM/Pyramid, that PCM/Pyramid or its agent was authorized to issue additional instructions, and that S & H agreed to follow the safety policy of PCM/Pyramid. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly refused to dismiss the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action on the ground that PCM/ Pyramid could not be found liable under the statute. Miller, J. P., Sullivan, Florio and Luciano, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.