Peacock v. Kalikow
Cases that cite this one
50 later published cases cite this decision. The 25 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Citimortgage, Inc. v. Jameson (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Ap X-Power Media, Inc. v. Ocean Bridge, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Gogos v. Modell's Sporting Goods, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- Hudson House LLC v. Gabriel (Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
- Elecnor, S.A. v. Petroleos De Venezuela, S.A. (New York Supreme Court, New York County 2025)
- Elecnor, S.A. v. Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (New York Supreme Court, New York County 2025)
- J.C. v. 2078 Arthur, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2025)
- Carpio v. 700 Third Ave. Assoc., LLC (New York Supreme Court, New York County 2024)
- Guaman v. USM Asset Trust-Series 7 (New York Supreme Court, New York County 2024)
- Kanner v. Westchester Med. Group, P.L.L.C. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2024)
- Belnord Partners LLC v. Green Star Energy Solutions, LLC (New York Supreme Court 2023)
- Decatur 1147 LLC v. Anson St. LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2023)
- Castillo v. 2460 Tiebout Ave. Assoc., LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2022)
- 259 Milford, LLC v. FV-1, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2022)
- San Lim v. MTA Bus Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2021)
- San Lim v. MTA Bus Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2021)
- Wise v. Classon Vil., L.P. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2019)
- Arctic Glacier USA, Inc. v. Good Enough To Eat Uptown, Ltd. (Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- Gorman v. English (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Parker v. Bonitas Youth Services, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Martinez v. Government Employees Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- Martinez v. Government Employees Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- Sunrise Capital Partners Management LLC v. Glattstein (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- Sunrise Capital Partners Management LLC v. Glattstein (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Paula Omansky, J.), entered on February 16, 1996, which granted defendant R&J Construction Corporation’s motion to vacate the default judgment against it, unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs, and the default judgment reinstated. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Plaintiff alleges that he was injured while working at a construction site when "carelessly, recklessly and/or negligently” placed boards of sheetrock fell on him. He brought a personal injury action against numerous parties, including R&J Construction Corporation ("R&J”), one of the site contractors. The action against R&J was commenced by serving the Secretary of State with two copies of the summons and complaint. Plaintiff’s counsel also mailed a copy of the summons and complaint to R&J, along with an affidavit of service on the
R&J contends that the first notice it ever received concerning the action was notice of the default judgment in August 1994, whereupon it sent the papers to its insurance broker. According to R&J, the broker failed to forward the papers to the insurance carrier, and, therefore, nothing was done with respect to the matter.
Indeed, it was not until sixteen months later, in December 1995, that defendant moved to vacate the default judgment. In support of its motion, two affidavits were submitted by R&J’s controller. These affidavits offered explanations for both periods of delay, i.e., the delay in defending the action and the delay in moving to vacate the default judgment. In both, the controller asserted that R&J had a meritorious defense to the action. The first affidavit stated that R&J was "unconnected with plaintiff” and that it had "no dealings with plaintiff nor did it owe or breach any obligation to plaintiff.” The second stated that R&J "is by no means liable to plaintiff in the instant action, either for negligent or intentional acts. R&J has no connection whatsoever to plaintiff, owed no duty to plaintiff, and in fact, has no independent knowledge of plaintiff’s claim.” These were the sole allegations of a meritorious defense. The subsequently assigned IAS Court concluded that this defense, which it termed " 'no dealing,’ ” was "flimsy but barely qualifies” and therefore granted defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment.
A party may move to vacate a default judgment against it under CPLR 317 or 5015. Even where the moving party cites only one statutory provision, the reviewing court may consider whether application of either statute would warrant the relief requested (Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 142-143). While it is unclear under which statute defendant’s motion was made, both statutes require that, in order to prevail, the movant must demonstrate that it has a meritorious defense to the action. Even where it is uncontroverted that defendant did not receive notice of the summons and complaint in time to defend the action, as defendant claims here, the failure to adequately demonstrate a meritorious defense will be fatal to defendant’s motion to vacate (Halali v Gabbay, 223 AD2d 623). Because defendant has failed in this respect, we reverse and reinstate the default judgment.
In contrast, the affidavit submitted by R&J was made by a party who does not assert the basis of his knowledge and was no more than a general disclaimer of any knowledge of or relationship with plaintiff. Such a disclaimer is not responsive to plaintiffs claim, and clearly fails to directly refute or specifically address the allegations in the complaint (see, Mitchell v Mid-Hudson Med. Assocs., supra; Beverage Distribs. v Schenley Indus., supra). Accordingly, it was error to grant the motion. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Sullivan, Milonas and Tom, JJ.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.