Cseh v. New York City Transit Authority
Cases that cite this one
17 later published cases cite this decision.
- Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. County of Nassau (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. County of Nassau (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- FTBK Investor II LLC v. Genesis Holding LLC (New York Supreme Court 2014)
- Jacobson v. Croman (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- Jacobson v. Croman (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- Coleman v. Chesebro-Whitman Co. (New York Supreme Court 1998)
- Idi v. Sela (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2025)
- Inspirit Dev. & Constr. LLC v. GMF 157 LP (New York Supreme Court, New York County 2024)
- Brandsway Hospitality, LLC v. Delshah Capital LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2023)
- Morse v. Fidessa Corp. (New York Supreme Court 2017)
- Borges v. Placeres (Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- Charles v. Suvannavejh (New York Supreme Court 2009)
- Countrywide Funding Corp. v. Reynolds (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2007)
- Inwood Tower Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
- Valdes v. Marbrose Realty, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2001)
- Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Konik Industries, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1998)
- Cseh v. New York City Transit Authority (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1997)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Stanley Sklar, J.), entered on or about March 19, 1996, which, upon deeming defendant-respondent’s motion to dismiss as one to amend its answer, granted said motion, and dismissed plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim against defendant-respondent as barred by the Statute of Limitations, unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs, the motion denied and the wrongful death claim is reinstated.
On March 17, 1983, plaintiffs’ decedent, 19-year-old Kenneth Cseh, was riding between subway cars when he fell onto the tracks, resulting in the severing of one leg, and the partial severing of another. He was brought to defendant Roosevelt Hospital, where the codefendant physicians attempted to reattach his leg. However, he died as a result of his injuries on April 15, 1983.
The plaintiffs initiated the action against the defendants on April 12, 1985, but due to a filing error, the action was not commenced until the defendant hospital received the summons on April 16, 1985, one day after the Statute of Limitations had expired. Nonetheless, the hospital never filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss the wrongful death claim as time-barred, nor
On August 14,1995, the hospital moved to dismiss the wrongful death claim as time-barred. No excuse for the 10-year delay in asserting the Statute of Limitations defense was offered. The IAS Court treated the motion as one to amend the answer to include the defense of the Statute of Limitations, and then dismissed the wrongful death claim on that ground. It found that plaintiffs were not prejudiced by the amendment since they had not identified any documents or deposition testimony, relating solely to the wrongful death claim, which they had been required to produce. According to the court, production of such evidence would have been required in any event because the plaintiffs had asserted wrongful death claims against the codefendant doctors. Lastly, the court stated that since plaintiffs had notice of the codefendants’ Statute of Limitations defenses, they should have moved to strike those defenses, and cannot claim prejudice by the hospital’s belated amendment.
Leave to amend pleadings is to be freely given absent prejudice or surprise directly resulting from the delay (CPLR 3025 [b]; see, Fahey v County of Ontario, 44 NY2d 934, 935; Seda v New York City Hous. Auth., 181 AD2d 469, 470, lv denied 80 NY2d 759; Armstrong v Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 150 AD2d 189, 190). Further, this Court has held that the late assertion of a Statute of Limitations defense, by itself, is no barrier to amendment; "[l]ateness must be coupled with significant prejudice to plaintiff” (Seda v New York City Hous. Auth., supra, at 470).
Contrary to the finding of the IAS Court however, we believe plaintiffs suffered significant prejudice from the hospital’s failure to assert the Statute of Limitations defense over a 10-year period. Relying on the hospital’s apparent waiver of this defense, plaintiffs participated in lengthy discovery proceedings that included 10 depositions and produced substantial evidence relevant to the wrongful death claim, such as an accounting report assessing the economic loss resulting from the decedent’s death, the decedent’s tax returns, funeral bills, high school records and insurance records (see, Cameron v 1199 Hous. Corp., 208 AD2d 454, 454-455). Although plaintiffs would have expended similar efforts to prosecute their wrongful death
Moreover, we have previously held that where the amendment is sought after a long delay, and a statement of readiness has been filed, judicial discretion in allowing the amendment should be " 'discreet, circumspect, prudent and cautious’ ” (Symphonic Elec. Corp. v Audio Devices, 24 AD2d 746, quoting Price v Brody, 7 AD2d 204, 206). In permitting the hospital to amend its answer after 10 years, without offering any excuse for the delay, we believe the court improvidently exercise its discretion. Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Milonas, Nardelli, Williams and Mazzarelli, JJ.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.