Barry, Bette & Led Duke, Inc. v. State
Cases that cite this one
18 later published cases cite this decision.
- Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. Dormitory Authority-State (District Court, S.D. New York 2010)
- RAD & D'Aprile Inc. v. Arnell Construction Corp. (New York Supreme Court 2015)
- North Moore Street Developers, LLC v. Meltzer/Mandl Architects, P.C. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- Inter Contr Corp v. City of Dallas Texas (5th Cir. 2003)
- Interstate Contracting Corp. v. City of Dallas (5th Cir. 2003)
- KSW Mechanical Services v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (District Court, E.D. New York 2014)
- Eastern Electric Corp. v. Shoemaker Construction Co. (District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania 2009)
- Interstate Contracting Corp. v. City of Dallas (Tex. 2004)
- Superior Gunite v. Ralph Mitzel Inc. (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
- Bovis Lend Lease LMB, Inc. v. GCT Venture, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2001)
- NAN, INC. v. WOOD ENVIRONMENT & INFRASTRUCTURE SOLUTIONS, INC. (District Court, D. New Jersey 2022)
- United States of America for the use and Benefit of Five Star Electric Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (District Court, S.D. New York 2020)
- Rad & D'Aprile, Inc. v. Arnell Constr. Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2018)
- Andrew R. Mancini Associates, Inc. v. Mary Imogene Bassett Hospital (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- IMS Engineers-Architects, P.C. v. State (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- Brownell Steel, Inc. v. Great American Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2006)
- I.T.R.I. Masonry Corp. v. State (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- Sky-Lift Corp. v. Flour City Architectural Metals, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
OPINION OF THE COURT
Claimant was the prime general contractor on a project for construction of a headquarters complex for the State Division of Military and Naval Affairs at the Albany County Airport. C.T. Brickman & Associates (hereinafter Brickman) subcontracted with claimant to install partitions and suspended acoustical ceilings in the complex. In December 1986, claimant filed a claim against the State for damages resulting from an alleged five-month delay in completing the project based upon, among other things, a May 2, 1985 stopwork order that the State had issued with regard to partition work in the headquarters building. Subsequently, in May 1988, claimant filed an amended claim asserting a second cause of action on behalf of Brickman (the only cause of action at issue on this appeal), seeking to recover the cost of additional work Brickman was required to perform in connection with its installation of acoustical ceilings in the area affected by the stopwork order.
At trial, the parties stipulated that it cost Brickman $25,532.41 to perform extra work necessitated by another subcontractor’s installation of fireproofing material during the time period covered by the stopwork order and prior to Brick-man’s installation of the ceilings. At the conclusion of the evidence, the State moved to dismiss the second cause of action based upon the lack of privity of contract between Brickman and the State. The Court of Claims denied the motion and, on the merits, found that the State was liable for the extra work performed by Brickman. The State appeals from the judgment awarding damages in the stipulated sum. At issue is the propriety of the Court of Claims’ finding of an implied liquidating agreement between claimant and Brickman under the terms of which claimant was to prosecute Brickman’s claim against the State and pay over to Brickman any award received in satisfaction of that claim. Because we conclude that the Court of Claims erred in that finding, we are constrained to reverse its judgment and dismiss claimant’s second cause of action.
As correctly observed by the Court of Claims, liquidating agreements, which are generally enforceable, need not take any particular form. They may be memorialized in the subcontract or in a separate written agreement and may be assembled from several documents executed over a period of years. Nonetheless, and this is where we diverge from the view expressed by the Court of Claims, there will be no liability in the general contractor absent an actual contractual commitment to that effect (see, Triangle Sheet Metal Works v Merritt & Co., 79 NY2d 801, 802; Phoenix Elec. Contr. v Lehr Constr. Corp., 219 AD2d 467, lv denied 87 NY2d 805).
At trial, neither claimant nor Brickman alleged the existence of any such agreement. Recognizing that fact, the Court of Claims nonetheless inferred a liquidating agreement between those parties by virtue of the fact that Brickman brought no action against claimant (“its failure to sue the only party with whom it is in privity is inexplicable unless it is acting in reliance on an understanding with [claimant] that its claim is going to be prosecuted by that party”) and that claimant pursued Brickman’s claim against the State (“there is no reason for [claimant] to consistently assert its subcontractor’s cause of action unless it, too, is carrying out the terms of an agreement with that party, an agreement from which it benefitted by not being made the defendant in a lawsuit”). We believe that the Court of Claims’ analysis in that regard is flawed.
As a final matter, we agree with the Court of Claims’ conclusion that section five of the subcontract, whereby claimant agreed to be bound to Brickman “by all the obligations that the [State] assumes to [claimant] under the contract between them”, merely imposed a duty upon claimant to compensate Brickman for delays, extra work and other losses resulting from claimant’s actions—not the actions of the State.
The parties’ remaining contentions have been considered and either found to be unavailing or need not be considered in light of our determination to dismiss the second cause of action.
Cardona, P. J., White, Spain and Carpinello, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, without costs, the State’s motion is granted, and claimant’s second cause of action is dismissed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.