Mendoza v. Marche Libre Associates
Cases that cite this one
8 later published cases cite this decision.
- Lopez v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. (New York Supreme Court, Bronx County 2025)
- Salinas v. Barney Skanska Construction Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2003)
- Quinlan v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
- Fowler v. CCS Queens Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2001)
- Canning v. Barneys New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2001)
- Lynch v. Abax, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2000)
- Dacchille v. Metropolitan Life Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1999)
- Conway v. Beth Israel Medical Center (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1999)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
—Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Howard Silver, J.), entered October 22, 1997, which, inter alia, granted the motion of defendant McDee Construction to dismiss plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
The motion court properly dismissed plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action predicated upon violations of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (e) and 23-2.1 (b). While we have held that violations of section 23-1.7 (e) (1) may support a Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action (Farina v Plaza Constr. Co., 238 AD2d 158), we agree with the motion court that the dumpster where plaintiff stepped on a nail does not constitute a “passageway” pursuant to that regulation, and, accordingly, that that regulation is not applicable to the facts at bar (see, Cafarella v Harrison Radiator Div., 237 AD2d 936; Basile v ICF Kaiser Engrs. Corp., 227 AD2d 959; Adams v Glass Fab, 212 AD2d 972). The other regulation upon which plaintiff relies, 12 NYCRR 23-2.1 (b), does not sufficiently set forth “a specific standard of conduct as opposed to a general reiteration of common-law principles” for its violation to qualify as a predicate for a Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action (Adams v Glass Fab, supra, at 973; Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 502-504). Concur — Lerner, P. J., Sullivan, Milonas, Rosenberger and Ellerin, JJ.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.