Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2000

Boral v. Clarkson University

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York · Decided March 23, 2000 · Spain

270 A.D.2d 776; 706 N.Y.S.2d 360; 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3091

Cases that cite this one

7 later published cases cite this decision.

State v. Quintal, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
JacksonvJamaicaHospitalMedicalCenter (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
Jackson v. Jamaica Hospital Medical Center (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
Jackson v. Jamaica Hospital Medical Center (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
Manchester Technologies, Inc. v. Hansen (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2004)
Mroz v. Ace Auto Body & Towing, Ltd. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2003)
Shedrick v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2000)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion of the Court

—Spain, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Demarest, J.), entered July 6, 1999 in St. Lawrence County, which denied defendant’s motion for a change of venue.

Plaintiff commenced this action in Nassau County, her place of residence, seeking to recover for personal injuries incurred when she slipped and fell on defendant’s sidewalk. Following joinder of issue, defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 510 (3) to change venue from Nassau County to St. Lawrence County where its campus is located. Supreme Court denied the motion and defendant appeals.

*777We affirm. CPLR 510 (3) provides for a discretionary change of venue where “the convenience of material witnesses and the ends of justice will be promoted by the change.” The proponent of such a motion bears the burden of proof and must “supply the names, addresses and occupations of the witnesses whose convenience [it] claims will be affected, indicate that the prospective witnesses have been contacted and are willing to testify on [its] behalf and specify the substance of each witness’s testimony, which must be necessary and material” (Andros v Roderick, 162 AD2d 813, 814; see, Stainbrook v Colleges of the Senecas, 237 AD2d 865; Stoyer v Feeney, 165 AD2d 946).

Based upon our review of defendant’s motion papers, we find that these requirements have not been satisfied. Significantly, defendant has not supplied the names, addresses or occupations of the witnesses whose convenience it claims will be affected, has not indicated that the prospective witnesses have been contacted and are willing to testify on its behalf, has not specified the substance of each witness’s testimony nor made a showing that such testimony is necessary and material. Accordingly, we perceive no basis upon which to conclude that Supreme Court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion (see, Stainbrook v Colleges of the Senecas, supra; Stoyer v Feeney, supra; Barney v Rochester Inst. of Technology, 105 AD2d 516).

Cardona, P. J., Crew III, Carpinello and Mugglin, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.