Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2000

Perez v. Ward

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York · Decided April 17, 2000

271 A.D.2d 590; 706 N.Y.S.2d 160; 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4320

Cases that cite this one

11 later published cases cite this decision.

HEYWARD, QUINN v. SHANNE, BRUCE (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
Heyward v. Shanne (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
Heyward v. Shanne (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
Munoz v. Puretz (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2003)
Griffin v. Tautel (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2003)
Galicia v. Ramos (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2003)
Batista v. Mohabir (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
Tha Rudder v. Skeete (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
Darden v. Foothill Mountain, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
Woods v. Alvarez (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
Bellony v. Siegel (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2001)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion of the Court

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Nastasi, J.), entered June 25, 1999, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

It is well settled that for a landlord to be liable for injuries resulting from a hazardous lead condition, it must be established, inter alia, that the landlord had actual or constructive notice of the condition for such a period of time that, in the exercise of reasonable care, it should have been corrected (see, Putnam v Stout, 38 NY2d 607).

In the instant case, the defendants received notice of the hazardous condition several weeks after the initial diagnosis of the infant plaintiff’s condition. After the defendants made out *591a prima facie case for summary judgment, the plaintiffs, in opposition, submitted evidence that the infant plaintiff may have sustained additional injury by continuing to ingest lead paint chips after the defendants had notice. The Supreme Court properly concluded that there are issues of fact whether, once the defendants had actual notice of the hazardous condition, they took reasonable and diligent efforts to abate the condition (see, Andrade v Wong, 251 AD2d 609; Brown v Marathon Realty, 170 AD2d 426; see also, Juarez v Wavecrest Mgt. Team, 88 NY2d 628). O’Brien, J. P., S. Miller, Friedmann and Smith, JJ., concur.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.