Kristen D. v. Stephen D.
Cases that cite this one
20 later published cases cite this decision.
- Mario WW. v. Kristin XX. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- Mario WW. v. Kristin XX. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- Starla D. v. Jeremy E. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Starla D. v. Jeremy E. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Edward WW. v. Diana XX. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
- Pearson v. Pearson (Utah Ct. App. 2006)
- In the Interest of Shockley (Tex. App. 2003)
- in the Interest of Regan Nicole Shockley, a Minor Child (Tex. App. 2003)
- Multari v. Sorrell (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2001)
- Matter of Montgomery County Dept. of Social Servs. v. Trini G. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2021)
- Matter of Schenectady County Dept. of Social Servs. v. Joshua BB. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2019)
- Matter of Montgomery County Dept. of Social Servs. v. Jose Y. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2019)
- Matter of Mario WW. v. Kristin XX. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2019)
- Matter of John J. v. Kayla I. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Matter of Stephen N. v. Amanda O. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Jason E. v. Tania G. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
- Elido B. v. Jennie C. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- Daldi V. v. Lorena V. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
- Sarah S. v. James T. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
- Robust I. v. Ronald J. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2001)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Warren County (Breen, J.), entered September 16, 1999, which (1) in a proceeding (No. 1) pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, awarded, inter alia, the parties joint legal custody of the child, and (2) dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding (No. 2) pursuant to Family Court Act article 5,
In September 1991, Kristen D. (hereinafter the mother) informed respondent Stephen D. (hereinafter respondent) that she was pregnant. The two were married in November 1991 and the mother gave birth to a daughter (hereinafter the child) in May 1992. Unbeknown to respondent, the mother had also engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse with petitioner Lawrence E. (hereinafter petitioner) during the critical period. When the child was around three years old, the mother began noticing her resemblance to petitioner. In September 1995, the mother contacted petitioner and discussed with him the possibility that he was the child’s father. The mother and petitioner arranged for DNA testing, which was performed in October 1995 and indicated a 99.99% probability that petitioner was the child’s biological father. At that point, the mother advised respondent of the test result. Of course, the revelation had a detrimental impact on their relationship, and respondent and the mother separated in November 1995. Following the separation, the child remained with the mother but respondent exercised regular visitation by agreement of the parties.
In March 1996, the mother commenced an action for divorce. Although the complaint made no allegation concerning the existence of children of the marriage, respondent counterclaimed for divorce and alleged that the child had been born as issue of the marriage. Supreme Court transferred the questions of custody, visitation and support to Family Court (proceeding No. 1) and pending its determination made a temporary award of visitation in favor of respondent. In August 1998, petitioner commenced proceeding No. 2 to establish that he is the biological father of the child. Following a trial on the issues of paternity, custody and visitation, and determining that the doctrine of equitable estoppel must be applied in order to protect the best interest of the child, Family Court dismissed the petition in proceeding No. 2 and awarded joint legal custody of the child to respondent and the mother, with primary physical custody in the mother. Petitioner and the mother appeal.
We affirm. The proof, either based upon uncontroverted trial evidence or as properly found by Family Court in the exercise of its fact-finding authority, establishes that respondent maintained an intimate parental relationship with the child from the time of her birth to the time of trial in 1999. At no time during that seven-year period was the child given any reason to question respondent’s status as her biological father. As recognized by Family Court in its comprehensive written
Courts have long recognized the availability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel as a defense in a paternity proceeding (see, Jean Maby H. v Joseph H., 246 AD2d 282; Matter of Richard W. v Roberta Y., 240 AD2d 812, lv denied 90 NY2d 809; Matter of Lorie F. v Raymond F., 239 AD2d 659, 660; Matter of James BB. v Debora AA., 202 AD2d 852, 853). Further, because a child’s best interest is of paramount concern in proceedings to establish paternity (see, Matter of James BB. v Debora AA., supra, at 853-854; Matter of Ettore I. v Angela D., 127 AD2d 6, 14) and recognizing “that the inevitable effect of destroying the child’s image of her family would be catastrophic and [fraught] with lasting trauma” (Matter of Ettore I. v Angela D., supra, at 15), the “courts are more inclined to impose equitable estoppel to protect the status of a child in an already recognized and operative parent-child relationship” (Matter of Lorie F. v Raymond F., supra, at 660; see, Matter of Glenn T. v Donna U., 226 AD2d 803).
Application of those legal principles to the facts of this case essentially compels the determination reached by Family Court. Given the nature, extent and duration of respondent’s relationship with the child, and recognizing that petitioner was unaware of his likely paternity during the first 3V2 years of the child’s life, we conclude that petitioner’s subsequent three-year delay in commencing a paternity proceeding provided ample justification for Family Court’s dismissal of the petition on the basis of equitable estoppel (see, Matter of Peter BB. v Robin CC., 256 AD2d 889, 890; Jean Maby H. v Joseph H., supra, at 289; Matter of Richard W. v Roberta Y., supra, at 814). As in Matter of Peter BB. v Robin CC. (supra, at 890), we believe
The parties’ remaining contentions have either been considered and found to be unavailing or have been rendered academic.
Cardona, P. J., Spain and Rose, JJ., concur; Mercure, J., not taking part. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.