Kerr v. Brown
Opinion of the Court
—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Herman Cahn, J.), entered March 1, 2000, which granted the motion of defendants-respondents to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motion denied and the complaint reinstated.
In August 1988, a singing group known as The New Style and its constituent individuals, Vincent Brown, Keir Gist and Anthony Criss, signed a recording agreement with Bon Ami
The IAS court erred in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis that Kerr had failed to allege the existence of an agreement granting the right to ownership of Brown, Gist and Criss’s musical compositions. On a motion to dismiss, the pleadings must be liberally construed (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87). The Renaissance-Kerr agreement clearly constituted an assignment of rights to publishing royalties and administration of compositions authored by the “artist” and its constituent members, individually or collectively. That Brown, Gist and Criss subsequently assumed a different stage name did not thereby deprive Kerr of his assigned property interest in their authored compositions, individually or collectively. Kerr alleged facts sufficient to establish an assignment of publishing rights by Renaissance to him (see, Whalen v Gerzof, 206 AD2d 688, lv denied 84 NY2d 809). Having made sufficient allegations of assignment, Kerr has standing to assert the assignor’s claims and is a real party in interest (Kahn
Although not addressed by the IAS court, defendants argue that the breach of contract claims are untimely since the breach of the song writing agreement occurred on August 20, 1991 when they signed a publishing agreement with Tommy Boy Music, more than six years prior to commencement of this action in 1998. Plaintiff is correct that individual breaches start the Statute of Limitations running anew each time (Bulova Watch Co. v Celotex Corp., 46 NY2d 606, 608). Since each song has a different publication date, each would be separately actionable. Accordingly, it would be premature to determine which claims may be time barred, if any, at the pleading stage. By the same token, it is premature to determine whether any of the defendants should be estopped from raising a Statute of Limitations defense on equitable grounds. Concur — Rosenberger, J. P., Andrias, Wallach, Rubin and Buckley, JJ.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.