Chapman v. Capoccia
Cases that cite this one
19 later published cases cite this decision.
- Wahl v. Lothiam (District Court, S.D. New York 2002)
- Krivit v. Pitula (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
- Ravi S.A. v. Gyebi (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2026)
- Fillette v. Lundberg (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- Brandt-Miller v. McArdle (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- Bissonette v. Compo (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2003)
- Berthold v. Williams (New York Supreme Court, Kings County 2025)
- Berthold v. Williams (New York Supreme Court, Kings County 2025)
- Vergine v. Phillips (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2018)
- Flanders v. National Grange Mutual Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2015)
- Flanders v. National Grange Mutual Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2015)
- Haque v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Haque v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Kranis v. Biederbeck (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Williams v. Baldor Specialty Foods, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
- Jackson v. Mungo One, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2004)
- Cowan v. Fish (New York Supreme Court, Ulster County 2004)
- Jones v. Davis (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2003)
- McCarthy v. Commercial Union Insurance (New York Supreme Court 2002)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Viscardi, J.), entered December 27, 1999 in Washington County, upon a dismissal of the complaint at the close of evidence.
Defendants do not dispute that they were retained by plaintiff to institute an action for injuries that he sustained in an automobile accident which occurred March 26, 1987. Likewise, defendants do not dispute that they failed to institute that action before it was barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations. The sole defense pursued in this legal malpractice action for defendants’ failure to commence a lawsuit with respect to said accident was that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), thus barring the personal injury action. At the close of proof, defendants moved to dismiss for plaintiff’s failure to establish the existence of a serious injury and for failure to establish a causal connection between the 1987 accident and plaintiffs claimed injury of posttraumatic stress disorder (hereinafter PTSD). Supreme Court reserved on the motion and submitted the case to the jury. By a vote of 5 to 1, the jury determined that (1) plaintiff suffered a permanent loss of use of a body function or system in the accident, (2) the accident was a
As a preliminary matter, although Supreme Court made reference to the posttrial motion in its decision, it is evident from reading the decision that the court did not set aside the jury verdict as against the weight of the evidence but, rather, granted defendants’ trial motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failure to establish a prima facie case on the issues of serious injury and proximate causation. The decision focuses entirely on the latter issues (see, Quinn v Licausi, 263 AD2d 820) and not on the former (see, Rosabella v Fanelli, 225 AD2d 1007, 1008). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Supreme Court incorrectly granted this motion and we therefore reverse.
Our analysis begins by recognizing, as did Supreme Court, that absent a serious injury, there could be no recovery in a personal injury action arising out of a motor vehicle accident (see, Licari v Elliott, 57 NY2d 230). Moreover, as Supreme Court correctly noted, “serious injury must be established through ‘competent medical evidence based upon objective medical findings and diagnostic tests’ ” (Uhl v Sofia, 245 AD2d 988, 990, quoting Eisen v Walter & Samuels, 215 AD2d 149, 150), and “[i]t is incumbent upon the court to decide in the first instance whether plaintiff has a cause of action to assert within the meaning of the statute” (Licari v Elliott, supra, at 237). While the physical injuries sustained by plaintiff in this accident undoubtedly would not qualify as serious within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), this Court (see, Sellitto v Casey, 268 AD2d 753; Spinrad v Gasser, 235 AD2d 687), and the other Appellate Divisions of this State (see, Wyman v Giarnella & Son, 170 AD2d 229; Quaglio v Tomaselli, 99 AD2d 487; Arno v Kennedy, 88 AD2d 754), have all recognized that an emotional injury, causally related to an automobile accident, can constitute a serious injury sufficient to maintain a cause of action to recover damages for noneconomic loss. Thus, this record must be examined to determine if there is objective medical evidence of PTSD within the guidelines of these cases.
Lastly, on this issue, since the motion to dismiss was not made until both sides had rested, we note that the psychiatrist who testified for defendants also diagnosed plaintiff as suffering from PTSD. Both psychiatrists testified to the four elements that must exist to support this diagnosis. Notably, neither psychiatrist testified to either the existence of diagnostic tests to objectively demonstrate the existence of PTSD or the need to rely on such tests in order to diagnose plaintiffs condition. Consequently, on this record, we hold that Supreme Court erred by dismissing plaintiffs complaint based on an absence of testimony concerning diagnostic testing and by finding that plaintiffs proof of PTSD was solely subjective.
The remaining issue is whether plaintiff established by competent evidence that his PTSD was causally related to the
Peters, J. P., Spain, Carpinello and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, motion denied and verdict reinstated.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.