McCarthy v. Zoning Board of Appeals
Cases that cite this one
13 later published cases cite this decision.
- Atlas Henrietta, LLC v. Town of Henrietta Zoning Board of Appeals (New York Supreme Court 2013)
- P & N Tiffany Properties, Inc. v. Village of Tuckahoe (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2006)
- Matter of Mimassi v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Vil. of N.Y. Mills (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2023)
- Matter of Weikel v. Town of W. Turin (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2018)
- Miranda Holdings, Inc. v. Town Bd. of Town of Orchard Park (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- New York Insurance Association, Inc. v. State of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Avery v. Aery (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- Beneke v. Town of Santa Clara (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2007)
- Boland v. Town of Northampton (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2006)
- Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Town Board of Windham (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2004)
- E & J Sylcox Realty, Inc. v. Town of Newburgh Planning Board (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2004)
- Smith v. Town of Plattekill (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2004)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Caruso, J.), entered September 26, 2000 in Schenectady County, which, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, inter alia, partially dismissed the petition/complaint as untimely.
In June 1971, the Town of Niskayuna, Schenectady County, presumptively adopted a zoning ordinance which, inter alia, required that professional buildings in R-2 zones abut on and access major and minor arterial highways. In furtherance of her plan to build a medical office building in an R-2 zone on Troy Road, petitioner applied for variances from the driveway spacing requirements and the requirement that professional buildings have access to major and minor arterial highways. The requested variances were denied by respondent Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Niskayuna in December 1999. In January 2000, petitioner commenced this combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment challenging the denial of the variances. In her first cause of action, petitioner alleges that the zoning ordinance is illegal and invalid because it was neither properly entered in the minutes of the Town Board nor properly published and posted in accordance with Town Law § 264. In her second cause of action, petitioner alleges that the provision requiring access to major and minor arterial highways should be declared invalid because it is inconsistent with the intent of the drafters and has been inconsistently applied during the life of the ordinance. Respondents’ amended answer includes the affirmative defense that petitioner’s claims are time barred.
In June 2000, during the pendency of these proceedings before Supreme Court, the Town amended its zoning ordinance to exclude professional office buildings in R-2 zones, but this fact was apparently not communicated to Supreme Court. Thereafter, Supreme Court, inter alia, dismissed petitioner’s first two causes of action as barred by the Statute of Limitations. Petitioner appeals.
To determine the applicable limitation period, we look to the
Since the applicable Statute of Limitations commences with the effective date of the presumptively valid enactment of the local law, both causes of action are time barred (see, Almor Assocs. v Town of Skaneateles, 231 AD2d 863). “To allow an alleged continuing harm which flows from a fully completed, separate, discrete act to infinitely extend the Statute of Limitations * * * would vitiate the purpose underlying the limitations period [citations omitted]” (Matter of Federation of Mental Health Ctrs. v DeBuono, 275 AD2d 557, 560).
Moreover, in the absence of any statutory authority that would toll the Statute of Limitations, petitioner’s claim in this respect must be rejected (see, Matter of King v Chmielewski, 76 NY2d 182, 187-188). Petitioner’s first and second causes of action are time barred. Under these circumstances, the parties’ remaining contentions are either unnecessary for us to address or are without merit.
Mercure, J. P., Crew III, Spain and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.