Shipkoski v. Watch Case Factory Associates
Cases that cite this one
15 later published cases cite this decision.
- Espinosa v. Azure Holdings II, LP (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- Jones v. 414 Equities LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- Mendoza v. Highpoint Associates, IX, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Cangialosi v. Gotham Construction. Co. (New York Supreme Court 2008)
- Perez v. ZZZ Carpentry, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2026)
- Sanchez v. Congregation of Emanuel of Westchester (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2024)
- Macancela v. E.W. Howell Co. LLC (New York Supreme Court, Kings County 2024)
- Paguay v. Cup of Tea, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2018)
- Quizhpi v. South Queens Boys & Girls Club, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2018)
- Martins v. Board of Education (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Vasquez v. Urbahn Associates Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
- Balladares v. Southgate Owners Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2007)
- Atai v. Dogwood Realty of N.Y., Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- Tylman v. School Construction Authority (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2004)
- Ford v. Luigi Caliendo & Sons, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2003)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
In an action to re
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The defendant, which is the owner of the subject vacant building, hired a contractor, among other things, to board up broken windows. The plaintiff, who was hired by the contractor, allegedly was injured when, as he was walking on the deteriorated third floor measuring windows for the installation of plywood, the floor gave way and he fell through. The Supreme Court denied his motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action to recover damages pursuant to Labor Law § 240 (1), finding that section to be inapplicable. We affirm, although for a reason different from that of the Supreme Court. We find that there are issues of fact as to whether Labor Law § 240 (1) is applicable.
Labor Law § 240 (1) was enacted “in recognition of the exceptionally dangerous conditions posed by elevation differentials at work sites” (Misseritti v Mark IV Constr. Co., 86 NY2d 487, 491). Furthermore, Labor Law § 240 (1) requires the use of the types of protective devices enumerated therein to prevent injuries arising from either “a difference between the elevation level of the required work and a lower level or a difference between the elevation level where the worker is positioned and the higher level of the materials or load being hoisted or secured” (Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co., 78 NY2d 509, 514; see Melo v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 92 NY2d 909; Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 501). There must be a foreseeable risk of injury from an elevation-related hazard to impose liability under the statute, as “defendants are liable for all normal and foreseeable consequences of their acts” (Gordon v Eastern Ry. Supply, 82 NY2d 555, 562). Thus, to establish a prima facie case pursuant to Labor Law § 240 (1), a plaintiff must demonstrate that the risk of injury from an elevation-related hazard was foreseeable, and that an absent or defective protective device of the type enumerated in the statute was a proximate cause of the injuries alleged (see Felker v Corning, Inc., 90 NY2d 219; Misseritti v Mark IV Constr. Co., supra). A plaintiff “need not demonstrate that the precise manner in which the accident happened or the injuries occurred was foreseeable” (Gordon v
Here, there are issues of fact as to whether the building was in such an advanced state of disrepair and decay from neglect, vandalism, and the elements that the plaintiffs work on the third floor exposed him to a foreseeable risk of injury from an elevation-related hazard, and whether the absence of a type of protective device enumerated under Labor Law § 240 (1) was a proximate cause of his injuries (see Gold v NAB Constr. Corp., 288 AD2d 434; Norton v Park Plaza Owners Corp., 263 AD2d 531; Avelino v 26 R.R. Ave., 252 AD2d 912). Accordingly, the plaintiffs motion was properly denied. Ritter, J.P., Goldstein, Friedmann and Luciano, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.