Batal v. Associated Universities, Inc.
Opinion of the Court
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Kitson, J.), entered October 16, 2000, which, upon a jury verdict, and upon the denial of the plaintiffs motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence, is in favor of the defendants and against him, dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law and the facts, the motion to set aside the jury verdict is granted, the complaint is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for a new trial, with costs to abide the event.
The plaintiff was injured when the motorcycle he was operat
The jury returned a verdict finding Collins not negligent. The trial court subsequently denied the plaintiffs motion to set aside the verdict.
The trial court applied an incorrect standard in considering the plaintiffs motion to set aside the jury verdict as against the weight of the evidence (see Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d 129, 132-133). Under the facts of this case, as a matter of law, Collins violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142 (a) and § 1172 (a) by proceeding into the intersection without yielding the right-of-way to the plaintiff. Such violations constitute negligence as a matter of law and could not be disregarded by the jury (see Sonaike v Jenious, 285 AD2d 457, 458; Nunziata v Birchell, 238 AD2d 555, 556; Dellavecchia v Zorros, 231 AD2d 549), notwithstanding that the plaintiff may have contributed to the accident by exceeding the speed limit and proceeding in the wrong lane. Moreover, Collins was obligated to see that which by the proper use of his senses he should have seen (see Ferrara v Castro, 283 AD2d 392, 393; Bolta v Lohan, 242 AD2d 356; Terrell v Kissel, 116 AD2d 637, 638-639), and the plaintiff, as the driver with the right of way, was entitled to anticipate that Collins would obey traffic laws which required him to yield (see Agin v Rehfeldt, 284 AD2d 352, 353, lv denied 97 NY2d 603; Cenovski v Lee, 266 AD2d 424). On these facts, the jury could not have returned a verdict that Collins was not negligent on any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Salamone v Barenbaum, 281 AD2d 199; Iqbal v Rubin, 238 AD2d 378, 379; Mohamed v Frische, 223 AD2d 628; Weiser v Dalbo, 184 AD2d 935, 936). Thus, its verdict should have been set
Since there will be a new trial, we note that, under the facts adduced, the plaintiff was entitled to a jury charge on the emergency doctrine (see PJI3d 2:14 [2001]). The emergency doctrine is applicable when a party is confronted by a sudden and unforeseen occurrence not of his own making (see Caristo v Sanzone, 96 NY2d 172, 175; Herbert v Morgan Drive-A-Way, 85 NY2d 895, revg on dissenting opn at 202 AD2d 886, 888-889; Ferrer v Harris, 55 NY2d 285, 293). Ritter, J.P., O’Brien, Crane and Cozier, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.