In re the Estate of Chiurazzi
Cases that cite this one
11 later published cases cite this decision.
- Matter of Buck (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2024)
- Matter of Romano (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Matter of Katherine Marra (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- In re Templeton (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- In re Templeton (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- In re the Estate of Sanger (New York Surrogate's Court 2014)
- In re the Estate of DelGatto (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- In re the Estate of DelGatto (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Jacks v. D'Ambrosio (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
- Scaturro v. Sutera (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- Whitehead v. Town House Equities, Ltd. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2004)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
In a contested probate proceeding, the objectants appeal from a decree of the Surrogate’s Court, Putnam County (Rooney, S.), dated May 9, 2001, which, after a nonjury trial, admitted the decedent’s will to probate.
Ordered that the decree is affirmed, with costs payable by the objectants personally.
The determination of the Surrogate, who presided at the trial and heard all of the testimony, is entitled to great weight in this case, which hinged on the credibility of the witnesses (see Matter of Margolis, 218 AD2d 738; Matter of Morris, 208
Although evidence was presented at trial that the decedent suffered from periods of confusion, the proponent established that the decedent was aware of the natural objects of her bounty, and the nature and extent of her property at the time the will was executed. Therefore, she possessed testamentary capacity (see Matter of Kumstar, 66 NY2d 691; Matter of Bustanoby, 262 AD2d 407). The testimony of the objectants’ experts, who never met or treated the decedent, was speculative, and, thus, not entitled to any weight (see Matter of Tracy, 221 AD2d 643; Matter of Swain, 125 AD2d 574).
Moreover, there was no evidence that the proponent exercised influence which amounted to “moral coercion * * * which, by importunity which could not be resisted, constrained the [decedent] to do that which was against [her] free will and desire but which [she] was unable to refuse or too weak to resist” (Children’s Aid Socy. of N.Y. v Loveridge, 70 NY 387, 394; see also Matter of Herman, 289 AD2d 239). Without a showing that undue influence was actually exerted upon the decedent, mere speculation that opportunity and motive to exert such influence existed is insufficient (see Matter of Fiumara, 47 NY2d 845).
The objectants’ remaining contentions are without merit. Feuerstein, J.P., O’Brien, Townes and Cozier, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.