People v. Rose
Opinion of the Court
The defendant’s contention that the verdict was not sup
Contrary to the defendant’s contention, he was not deprived of a fair trial by the introduction of uncharged crimes and prior bad acts involving the complainant. Such evidence was admissible to establish whether the defendant placed the complainant in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury, or death (see Penal Law § 215.51 [b] [hi]). In addition, the trial court providently exercised its discretion in weighing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect (see People v Hudy, 73 NY2d 40, 54-55; People v Alvino, 71 NY2d 233; People v Caldarola, 288 AD2d 234, Iv denied 97 NY2d 752).
Although the consecutive sentences imposed are legally permissible because the convictions stem from separate and distinct acts (see Penal Law § 70.25 [2]), the aggregate term of imprisonment of 24 to 72 years violates the statutory maximum (see Penal Law § 70.30 [1] [e]). However, since the Department of Correctional Services will administratively recalculate the sentence to reflect the legally authorized limit, there is no reason to modify the judgment (see People v Moore, 61 NY2d 575, 578; People v Sheppard, 273 AD2d 498, 500; People v Brunskill, 200 AD2d 752, 754).
The defendant’s remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Santucci, J.P., McGinity, Luciano and Adams, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.