Bonura v. KWK Associates
Cases that cite this one
13 later published cases cite this decision.
- Giancola v. Yale Club of N.Y. City (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2018)
- Ramjohn v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- Hettich v. 125 East 50th Street Co., LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- Hettich v. 125 East 50th Street Co., LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- Brethour v. Alice Hyde Medical Center (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Cordeiro v. TS Midtown Holdings, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Johnson v. Ebidenergy, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- Torres v. Cordice (Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York 2006)
- Havlin v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- Debellis v. NYU Hospitals Center (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2004)
- Coku v. Millar Elevator Industries, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2004)
- Vanderwiele v. Steiglehner (New York Supreme Court 2004)
- Vanderwiele v. Steiglehner (New York Supreme Court, Sullivan County 2004)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Edward Lehner, J.), entered March 13, 2002, which, inter alia, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment to the extent of dismissing plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240 (1) claim and dismissing, in part, his claim pursuant to Labor Law § 241 (6), but denied the motion with respect to the balance of the Labor Law § 241 (6) claim and plaintiffs Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims, unanimously modified, on the law (1) to grant defendants’ motion to the further extent of dismissing the Labor Law § 241 (6) claim in its entirety, and (2) to reinstate the common-law negligence cause of action to the extent it asserts a theory of res ipsa loquitur, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiff, an elevator mechanic, was allegedly injured when, as he stepped onto the roof of an elevator cab in defendants’ building, the escape hatch cover in the cab’s roof gave way under him and he fell into the cab. Plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240 (1) claim was properly dismissed since the escape hatch cover was not a protective device within the contemplation of the statute and, accordingly, plaintiffs accident was not attributable to the failure of a statutorily mandated protective device (see Rodgers v 72nd St. Assoc., 269 AD2d 258 [2000]; Gabbamonte v 16-20 W 19th St., 14 AD2d 518 [1961]).
However, defendants’ motion for summary judgment was properly denied with respect to plaintiffs Labor Law § 200 and
The motion court erred in rejecting plaintiffs’ assertion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur at this stage in the litigation. In order to rely on said doctrine, a plaintiff must show that the event was of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; that it was caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and that it was not due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of plaintiff (see Kambat v St. Francis Hosp., 89 NY2d 489, 494 [1997]).
The motion court found that the doctrine applies only when “the actual or specific cause of an accident is unknown,” whereas here, “the circumstances surrounding the occurrence that forms the basis of this action are known.” The court misapplied this principle. Even though some of the circumstances of this accident might be known (i.e., that plaintiff stepped on the hatch cover, which gave way, causing him to fall), the “actual or specific cause of [the] accident” remains unknown. Indeed, the specific cause may have been a defective hatch, a hatch misplaced by defendants, or due to some other reason.
Nor is the doctrine rendered inapplicable by any action or contribution by plaintiff. The mere stepping on the hatch cover, without any facts or inferences suggesting negligence by plaintiff, cannot eliminate the res ipsa loquitur doctrine from the case at this juncture (see Pavon v Rudin, 254 AD2d 143, 145 [1998]). In any event, a plaintiff “need not conclusively eliminate the possibility of all other causes of the injury,” so long as the evidence affords a “rational basis for concluding that ‘it is more likely than not’ that the injury was caused by defendant’s negligence” (Kambat v. St. Francis Hosp., 89 NY2d at 494, quoting Restatement [Second] of Torts § 328D, Comment e). As plaintiffs have adequately made such a showing here, we modify to reinstate plaintiffs’ assertion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments for affirmative relief and find them unavailing. Concur—Buckley, P.J., Nardelli, Mazzarelli, Sullivan and Gonzalez, JJ.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.