Wynter v. Our Lady of Mercy Medical Center
Cases that cite this one
18 later published cases cite this decision.
- Public Adm'r, as Adm'r of the Estate of Ronald Simpson v. Levine (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Strum v. Bressler (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2023)
- Strum v. Bressler (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2023)
- Davis v. Port (New York Supreme Court 2023)
- Mercer v. Hebrew Home for the Aged at Riverdale (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2020)
- Petion v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2019)
- Tokar v. Weissberg (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2018)
- Wynter v. Our Lady of Mercy Medical Center (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- White v. Diallo (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- Appleby v. Suggs (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Velez v. New York Presbyterian Hospital (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Rose v. Frankel (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Largo-Chicaiza v. Westchester Scaffold Equipment Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Peters v. City of New York Health & Hospitals Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- Estevez v. Coleman (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- Loschiavo v. DeBruyn (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2004)
- Thomas v. Benedictine Hospital (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2004)
- Poag v. Atkins (New York Supreme Court, New York County 2004)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Douglas McKeon, J.), entered April 5, 2002, which granted defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 1021 for failure to timely substitute a representative for the deceased plaintiff and denied plaintiffs’ cross motion to substitute a representative of the estate of the deceased plaintiff and to amend the complaint to include a wrongful death cause of action, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motions denied, the complaint reinstated and the cross motion granted, and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
During the interim, a law firm and present counsel Bruce Katz were disputing who represented plaintiffs. The dispute regarding representation was decided by a January 17, 2001 order of Bronx County Supreme Court (Stanley Green, J.), directing that Katz represent plaintiffs.
Also during the interim, additional motion practice had ensued in the present action including dismissal motions related to the lack of progress in the litigation, during which time Katz became ill and underwent surgery. Unfortunately, in the aftermath of the destruction of the World Trade Center, Katz also was displaced from his home, which was located 500 feet from Ground Zero. As a consequence, he lost many files. Defendants moved thereafter to dismiss for plaintiffs’ failure to appoint an administrator.
On December 17, 2001, plaintiff cross-moved to substitute Othilda Wynter as executor and to submit an amended complaint, now adding a cause of action for wrongful death. In that connection, a physician’s affirmation of merit was submitted in which the physician averred that the quadriplegia caused by Clifton Wynter’s original fall resulted in his incontinence and the consequential necessity of chronic urinary drainage by catheter, and a constant weakness of his respiratory muscles. The physician further averred that Wynter was admitted to defendant medical center on December 15, 1999, in septic shock, from which he died on December 26, 1999, and that the sepsis
In granting the motion to dismiss, Supreme Court noted various delays occurring during the pendency of the litigation, found counsel’s explanation for the delays to be inadequate, and dismissed for failure to timely substitute a legal representative for the deceased plaintiff. The court also found the physician’s affirmation of merit inadequate. The court, in denying the cross motion to add a cause of action for wrongful death, also faulted the affiant for not specifying what records were reviewed as support for the opinion that decedent’s quadriplegia was a contributing factor in his demise, resulting in an absence of competent medical proof showing a causal nexus between the injury and the alleged malpractice.
If a case is dismissed for failure to timely effect substitution pursuant to CPLR 1021, the plaintiff, in order to achieve reinstatement, must demonstrate a prima facie showing of merit, a reasonable excuse for the delay and no undue prejudice to the defendants (Schwartz v Montefiore Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 305 AD2d 174, 176 [2003]). Parenthetically, this action will likely rely significantly on medical records and other documentary proofs rather than on eyewitnesses or other testimony. As such, aside from conclusory claims that the fact of delay has impeded the presentation of a defense, we find no significant likelihood of undue prejudice should the complaint be reinstated (Noriega v Presbyterian Hosp., 305 AD2d 220, 221 [2003]). In any event, defendants have failed to articulate any particular prejudice except for the fact that time has passed, which, standing alone, we have found to be an insufficient basis for finding prejudice (Peterson v City of New York, 286 AD2d 287 [2001]). Moreover, the record evinces several unusual circumstances that contributed to, and adequately explained, the delay in issue. Counsel’s affirmation established that there had been an ongoing dispute over who represented plaintiffs, which was not resolved until January 17, 2001, a dispute which we do not attribute to plaintiffs. Counsel’s life-threatening and extensive illness, and the attendant surgeries, provide a further explanation for counsel’s lack of activity during this time period, and the unanticipated and catastrophic impediment caused by the destruction of the World Trade Center provide further explanation for the delay (Schwartz, supra). Although any one of these factors might have been inadequate, their juxtaposition persuades us, now that the substitution has been achieved, that reinstatement is appropriate. Finally, under the circumstances of this
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.