In re First Central Insurance
Cases that cite this one
14 later published cases cite this decision.
- United States Liability Insurance v. Winchester Fine Arts Services, Inc. (District Court, S.D. New York 2004)
- Garay v. National Grange Mutual Insurance (2d Cir. 2004)
- XL Specialty Insurance Company v. Prestige Fragrances Inc. (District Court, S.D. New York 2019)
- Nabutovsky v. Burlington Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Guayara v. Hudson Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- Northern Insurance v. Sachs (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- Paul Developers, LLC v. Maryland Casualty Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2006)
- Vacca v. State Farm Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- Gershow Recycling Corp. v. Transcontinental Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- Escobar v. Colonial Indemnity Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- Becker v. Colonial Cooperative Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- Government Employees Insurance v. Jones (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2004)
- Viggiano v. Encompass Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2004)
- Potter v. North Country Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2004)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Aurelio Malave, the claimant, challenges a notice of disclaimer of coverage sent by First Central Insurance Company (hereinafter FCIC) to, among others, its insured with a copy to him, who was the injured party, in accordance with Insurance Law § 3420 (d). FCIC first received notice of the accident approximately 4½ years after the alleged injury occurred, and approximately two years after the claimant commenced a personal injury action against the insured, in which the insured was declared in default. The notice of accident, sent by the insured’s broker, was late as a matter of law (see Deso v London & Lancashire Indem. Co. of Am., 3 NY2d 127, 130 [1957]; Matter of DeLeon v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 243 AD2d 475, 476 [1997]; Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v Timm, 237 AD2d 586, 587 [1997]; Town Bd. of Town of Poughkeepsie v Continental Ins. Co., 213 AD2d 475, 477 [1995]; Platsky v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 181 AD2d 764, 765 [1992]).
Contrary to the claimant’s assertions, the notice the claimant provided to the insured’s insurance broker was not notice to the insurer (see Security Mut. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v Acker-Fitzsimons Corp., 31 NY2d 436, 442 n 3 [1972]; Serravillo v Sterling Ins. Co., 261 AD2d 384, 385 [1999]; Incorporated Vil. of Pleasantville v Calvert Ins. Co., 204 AD2d 689 [1994]). The claimant did not exercise his right pursuant to Insurance Law § 3420 (a) (3) to provide independent notification to FCIC. Consequently, the disclaimer letter, which stated untimely notice by the insured as the ground for disclaimer, without any reference to untimely notice by the claimant, was proper (see Travelers Indem. Co. v Worthy, 281 AD2d 411, 412 [2001]; Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v Harris, 193 F Supp 2d 674, 680 [2002]).
The claimant’s remaining contentions are without merit. Santucci, J.P., Schmidt, Adams and Crane, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.