Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2004

Ruland v. Long Island Power Authority

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York · Decided March 15, 2004

5 A.D.3d 580; 774 N.Y.S.2d 84

Cases that cite this one

9 later published cases cite this decision.

Lamela v. City of New York (District Court, E.D. New York 2008)
Lamela v. City of New York (2d Cir. 2009)
Lamela v. City of New York (2d Cir. 2009)
Reyes v. Astoria 31st St. Developers, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2021)
WROBEL, MICHAEL v. COUNTY OF NIAGARA (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
Wrobel v. Town of Pendleton (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
Wrobel v. Town of Pendleton (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
Balladares v. Southgate Owners Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2007)
Payne v. 100 Motor Parkway Associates, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2007)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion of the Court

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from so much of (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Lifson, J.), entered January 2, 2003, as granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ cause of action to recover damages for violations of Labor Law § 241 (6), and (2) a judgment of the same court, entered January 22, 2003, upon the order, as dismissed that cause of action.

Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the respondent.

The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action (see Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).

The injured plaintiff was working at a power substation owned by the defendant when the ground surrounding an eight-foot deep, two-foot diameter excavation settled, causing him to fall into a depression that had formed near the excavation. He and his wife commenced this action against the defendant alleging, inter alia, violations of Labor Law § 241 (6), based upon the defendant’s alleged failure to comply with three provisions of the Industrial Code, 12 NYCRR 23-4.1 (a), 23-4.2 (a), and 23-4.2 (h). The Supreme Court granted that branch of the defendant’s *581motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ cause of action to recover damages for violations of Labor Law § 241 (6). We affirm insofar as appealed from.

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contentions, all three provisions of the Industrial Code upon which they rely are inapplicable to the facts of this case, as all three regulations are intended to prevent accidents or to protect classes of persons other than those involved here (see Sainato v City of Albany, 285 AD2d 708 [2001]; Friot v Wal-Mart Stores, 240 AD2d 890 [1997]).

In light of this determination, we need not reach the parties’ remaining contentions. Florio, J.P., Schmidt, Mastro and Rivera, JJ., concur.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.