Kerr v. Kerr
Cases that cite this one
14 later published cases cite this decision.
- Jon v. Jon (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- Heinemann v. Heinemann (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2020)
- Reiner v. Reiner (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- Forman v. Forman (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2022)
- Marinakis v. Marinakis (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2021)
- Barone v. Barone (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2021)
- Mizrahi v. Mizrahi (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2019)
- Reiner v. Reiner (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Gardella v. Remizov (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Label v. Label (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
- Katz v. Katz (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2007)
- Rubin v. Rubin (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2006)
- Kerr v. Kerr (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- Percoco v. Lesnak (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
In an action for rescission of a separation agreement, the defendant appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Henry, J.), dated May 9, 2003, as denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
A separation agreement may be set aside upon a showing of fraud or duress, or where the agreement is manifestly unfair to a spouse because of the other spouse’s overreaching (see Christian v Christian, 42 NY2d 63 [1977]; Cardinal v Cardinal, 275 AD2d 756, 757 [2000]). To rescind a separation agreement on the ground of overreaching, a plaintiff must demonstrate both
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, an attorney in a matrimonial law firm, agreed to represent her in the execution of their own separation agreement, that he asked the plaintiff not to speak to any other attorney, and that he misrepresented the law and failed to fully disclose her legal rights on the issues of child support and equitable distribution. The defendant denied the allegation that he represented the plaintiff, pointing to the plaintiff’s initials on the page of the separation agreement containing an acknowledgment that the parties were without legal representation.
Although the defendant’s evidence demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, accepting the plaintiffs versions of the facts as true for the purpose of this motion (see Kavanagh v Kavanagh, 2 AD3d 688 [2003]; Menzel v Plotnick, 202 AD2d 558 [1994]), she raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement were manifestly unfair (see Kavanagh v Kavanagh, supra). Therefore, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Niosi v Niosi, 205 AD2d 514 [1994]).
Contrary to the defendant’s contention, since the plaintiff commenced this action soon after she discovered the alleged misrepresentations and omissions by the defendant, the action was not barred by her accepting benefits and making child support payments under the agreement for over three years following its execution (see Murphy v Murphy, 212 AD2d 583 [1995]).
In view of the foregoing, we need not reach the defendant’s remaining contentions. Santucci, J.P., Schmidt, Rivera and Lifson, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.