Carnazza v. Shoprite of Staten Island
Cases that cite this one
11 later published cases cite this decision.
- Bates v. Galligan (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2006)
- Zrake v. New York City Department of Education (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- Hodges v. Sidial (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- Energy Brands, Inc. v. Utica Mutual Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2007)
- SS Constantine & Helen's Romanian Orthodox Church of America v. Z. Zindel, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2007)
- Low Surgical & Medical Supply, Inc. v. McAfee (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- Marinoff v. Natty Realty Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- Orangetown Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Town of Orangetown (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- Tyberg v. Neustein (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospital v. Blue Ridge Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- Hyde Park Motor Co. v. Sucato (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Maltese, J.), dated November 17, 2003, as granted those branches of the plaintiffs motion which were to vacate an order of the same court dated October 25, 2002, granting its motion for summary judgment upon the plaintiffs default in opposing the motion, and to vacate an order of the same court dated April 9, 2002, granting its motion to preclude the plaintiff from testifying at trial as to lost earnings upon his default in opposing the motion.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
A party seeking to vacate an order entered upon default is required to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default, and the existence of a meritorious cause of action or defense (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Henry v Kuveke, 9 AD3d 476 [2004]; Weekes v Karayianakis, 304 AD2d 561 [2003]; Parker v City of New York, 272 AD2d 310 [2000]). The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse for a default lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court (see London v Iceland Inc., 306 AD2d 517 [2003]; J.P. Equip. Rental & Materials v Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 288 AD2d 187 [2001]; Parker v City of New York, supra). Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in finding
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.