Guippone v. Gaias
Cases that cite this one
12 later published cases cite this decision.
- Nehmadi v. Davis (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- 70-35 113th St. Holdings, LLC v. Auberge Grand Cent., LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2026)
- Kok Chai Lee v. Robertson (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2018)
- 11-01 36 Ave. LLC v. Quamar (New York Supreme Court 2016)
- 11-01 36 Avenue LLC v. Quamar (New York Supreme Court 2016)
- Decatur (2004) Realty, LLC v. Cruz (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
- Somma v. Richardt (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- Bowery Boy Realty, Inc. v. H.S.N. Realty Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- Zullo v. Varley (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- Pekich v. James E. Lawrence, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2007)
- Marcantonio v. Picozzi (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2007)
- Jacobowitz v. Leak (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
In an action for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Jones, J.), dated July 11, 2003, which granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment directing specific performance of the contract, and denied her cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and vacating the notice of pendency.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
In February 2002 the parties entered into a contract whereby
The plaintiffs demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]). While the original contract did not include a provision that time was of the essence, the plaintiffs’ letter dated April 18, 2002, provided unequivocal notice that April 23, 2002, was a closing date where time was of the essence (see Moray v DBAG, Inc., 305 AD2d 472 [2003]; Savitsky v Sukenik, 240 AD2d 557 [1997]; Mohen v Mooney, 162 AD2d 664 [1990]), and that the failure of the defendant to comply would result in the commencement of an action against her (see Moray v DBAG, Inc., supra; Cave v Kollar, 296 AD2d 370 [2002]; Tarlo v Robinson, 118 AD2d 561 [1986]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). In particular, the defendant neither objected to the plaintiffs’ April 18, 2002, notice nor exercised her right to cancel the contract until September 12, 2002.
The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit. Santucci, J.P., Schmidt, Adams and Skelos, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.