In re the Arbitration between Travelers Insurance & Youdas
Cases that cite this one
7 later published cases cite this decision.
- Faragon v. American Home Assurance Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- BOYSON, KAREN v. KWASOWSKY, IRENE (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2015)
- Boyson v. Kwasowsky (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2015)
- Boyson v. Kwasowsky (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2015)
- Gallaher v. Republic Franklin Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
- Rosado v. Hartford Fire Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
- Kobeck v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. (New York Supreme Court 2007)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Hester, Jr., J.), entered April 23, 2004 in Broome County, which granted petitioner’s application pursuant to CELR 7503 to stay arbitration between the parties.
The SUM endorsement in petitioner’s policy provides that an individual is an “insured” if, among other things, he or she is “occupying” a covered motor vehicle. “Occupying” is defined by the policy as “in, upon, entering into, or exiting from a motor vehicle” (see generally Insurance Law § 3420 [f] [3]). We note that the term has long received a liberal interpretation (see Rowell v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 77 NY2d 636, 639 [1991]) and, thus, “the status of passenger is not lost even though [an individual] is not in physical contact with [the vehicle], provided there has been no severance of connection with it, his [or her] departure is brief and he [or she] is still vehicle-oriented with the same vehicle” (Matter of Rice v Allstate Ins. Co., 32 NY2d 6, 11 [1973]). For example, where a person parks, gets out of a car and walks to the rear of the vehicle to remove a gift from the trunk, the person is still “occupying” the vehicle because “opening a trunk for the purpose of removing objects is a course of conduct reasonably incidental to leaving and alighting from a car” (Mackie v Unigard Ins. Co., 90 Or App 500, 505, 752 P2d 1266, 1269 [1988]).
Under the circumstances, we conclude that respondent, who had just exited the vehicle and was in the process of unloading the van to make his delivery, had not yet severed his connection with the van and was still vehicle-oriented at the time he was struck. That is, he was still in the process of alighting or exiting from the van and, contrary to petitioner’s argument, his conduct in unloading the van was not part of a new or separate course of conduct unrelated to the vehicle (see Matter of Allstate Co. v Flaumenbaum, 62 Misc 2d 32, 44-47 [1970]; see also Mackie v Unigard Ins. Co., supra at 504-505, at 1268-1269 [1988]). Accordingly, while we agree with petitioner that respondent’s mere
Crew III, Spain, Rose and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and application denied.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.