Green v. Peterson
Opinion of the Court
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously modified on the law by denying in part the motion of defendants Steven L. Peterson and Leroy Peterson and reinstating the first and sixth causes of action and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.
Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries that he sustained while fighting a fire as a volunteer for the Minoa Fire Department, one of several fire departments/districts that responded to the scene of the fire. Plaintiff was injured by the collapse of a pile of burning silage from a farm silo that was being demolished by private contractors hired by the farm owners in conjunction with and in aid of the firefighting efforts. Plaintiff commenced this action against the farm owners, Steven L. Peterson and Leroy Peterson (Petersons); the demolition contractor, Woodford Bros., Inc. (Woodford); and the equipment supply contractor, Crouse Construction, Inc. (Crouse). Woodford commenced a third-party action against Kirkville Fire District (Kirkville), Village of Minoa-Minoa Fire Department (Minoa), and Town of Sullivan Fire District (Sullivan), seeking common-law indemnification and contribution. Crouse interposed cross claims for contribution and common-law indemnification against the Petersons and Woodford and also interposed what it termed a “cross claim” against Kirkville, Minoa and Sullivan for that same relief. The Petersons likewise interposed what they termed “cross claims” for contribution and common-law indemnification against Kirkville, Minoa and Sullivan.
We conclude that Supreme Court properly denied those parts of the cross motion of Woodford for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action against it for common-law negligence and the violation'of General Municipal Law § 205-a and General
We conclude that the court properly granted that part of the motion of Sullivan for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint against it (see General Municipal Law § 205-b; Howell v Massapequa Fire Dist., 306 AD2d 317, 318 [2003]). We further conclude that the court properly denied those parts of the cross motion of Crouse for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action for common-law negligence and the violation of General Municipal Law § 205-a and General Obligations Law § 11-106 against it (see Abad, 1 AD3d at 1041; Brennan, 302 AD2d at 484-485).
In addition, we conclude that the court properly denied the respective motions of Kirkville and Minoa for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint against them. As the court concluded, there are triable issues of fact with regard to various elements of the test for ascertaining whether the municipal entities, which are sought to be held liable for the negligent performance of a discretionary governmental function, were in the requisite special relationship with, and thus owed the requisite duty to, either plaintiff (see Lauer v City of New York, 95 NY2d 95, 102 [2000]; Kircher v City of Jamestown, 74 NY2d 251, 257 [1989]; Cuffy v City of New York, 69 NY2d 255, 260 [1987]) or Woodford, the impleading defendant (see Garrett v Holiday Inns, 58 NY2d 253, 261 [1983]).
With respect to the cross appeal of plaintiff, we conclude that the court properly granted the respective motion and cross mo
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.