McLaughlin v. Hernandez
Cases that cite this one
7 later published cases cite this decision.
- Giangrande v. Gracie Gardens Owners Corp (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2025)
- Matter of Donmartin v. New York City Hous. Auth. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2020)
- Bey v. Sobro Local Dev. Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2019)
- Cherry v. New York City Housing Authority (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- Lakins v. New York City Housing Authority (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- Bobian v. New York City Housing Authority (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- Tydings v. Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2007)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The IAS court erred in annulling NYCHA’s default determination since the particular circumstances herein did not warrant reopening it. The notice provided by NYCHA was clearly consistent with federal and state law, regulations and administrative policy governing tenancy termination proceedings in public housing, wherein NYCHA is not obligated to serve such notice on household members other than the tenant of record (see e.g. Escalera v New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F2d 853 [1970], cert denied 400 US 853 [1970]; 24 CFR 966.4 [e] [8] [ii] [A]; 53 Fed Reg 33216, 33246-33247 [1988] [codified at 24 CFR 966.50 et seq.]; Matter of Abdil v Martinez, 307 AD2d 238 [2003]; Matter of Faison v New York City Hous. Auth., 283 AD2d 353 [2001]; Matter of Figueroa v Hernandez, 194 Misc 2d 413 [2002]; New York City Hous. Auth. v McClinton, 184 Misc 2d 818 [2000]). Petitioner’s mother, the tenant of record, appeared before NYCHA in this matter on three separate occasions, prior to her default, but never affirmatively indicated that she had terminated or intended to terminate her residency in the unit. Thus, petitioner’s attempt to assert remaining head of household status occurred only after the tenancy had been terminated and any claim she might have had to such status was extinguished (see 24 CFR 966.53 [f]; Matter of Abdil v Martinez, 307 AD2d 238 [2003], supra; Matter of Faison v New York City Hous. Auth., 283 AD2d 353 [2001], supra; Matter of Figueroa v Hernandez, 194 Misc 2d 413 [2002], supra). Consequently, NYCHA’s determination to uphold the default was rationally based in well-settled law and administrative policy, and was not arbitrary or capricious, and the court should have deferred to it (Matter of Salvati v Eimicke, 72 NY2d 784, 791 [1988]; Matter of Nelson v Roberts, 304 AD2d 20, 23 [2003]; Matter of Malek v Franco, 263 AD2d 427, 429 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 762 [2000]), instead of incorrectly shifting the burden of proving the mother’s continued residency from petitioner to NYCHA.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.