Manzi v. Town of Riverhead
Cases that cite this one
33 later published cases cite this decision. The 25 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Cruz v. Doar (New York Supreme Court 2013)
- Matter of Cartwright v. Kennedy (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2024)
- East End Property Co. 1 v. Town Board of Town of Brookhaven (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- Village of Chestnut Ridge v. Town of Ramapo (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2007)
- Lee v. Chun Ka Luk (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2026)
- Matter of Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns. v. Town Bd. of the Town of Greenburgh (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2022)
- Matter of Green Earth Farms Rockland, LLC v. Town of Haverstraw Planning Bd. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- Matter of Ten Towns to Preserve Main St. v. Planning Bd. of Town of N. E. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Shinnecock Neighbors v. Town of Southampton (New York Supreme Court 2016)
- SIERRA CLUB v. VILLAGE OF PAINTED POST (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- Sierra Club v. Village of Painted Post (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- Sierra Club v. Village of Painted Post (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- Tuxedo Land Trust, Inc. v. Town Board of Town of Tuxedo (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- Tuxedo Land Trust, Inc. v. Town Board of Town of Tuxedo (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- Riverhead Neighborhood Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Town of Riverhead Town Board (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- Riverhead Neighborhood Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Town of Riverhead Town Board (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- Al-Ber, Inc. v. New York City Department of Finance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- East End Resources, LLC v. Town of Southold Planning Board (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Miller v. Mulligan (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
- Shanor Electric Supply, Inc. v. FAC Continental, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
- Bloodgood v. Town of Huntington (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- 1300 Franklin Avenue Members, LLC v. Board of Trustees of Incorporated Village (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- Jim Ludtka Sporting Goods, Inc. v. City of Buffalo School District (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- Town of Riverhead v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- Shelter Island Ass'n v. Zoning Board of Appeals (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the motion which was to dismiss the petition insofar as asserted by the petitioners Irving Walston, Jr., and Thomas Pipczynski for lack of standing and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, the proceeding insofar as asserted by the petitioner Richard Manzi, as trustee for the Joseph G. Manzi Irrevocable Trust, is severed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for further proceedings on the petition insofar as asserted by the petitioner Richard Manzi, as trustee for the Joseph G. Manzi Irrevocable Trust; and it is further,
Ordered that the respondent’s time to answer the petition is extended until 20 days after service upon them of a copy of this decision and order.
In October 1994 the Town of Riverhead and the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (hereinafter the DEC) entered into a stipulation of settlement requiring the Town to close its Youngs Avenue municipal solid waste landfill
In April 2001 the Town Board of the Town of Riverhead (hereinafter the Town Board) adopted Resolution No. 377, declaring that implementation of the landfill reclamation plan was a Type II action under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (hereinafter SEQRA). On August 1, 2002, the DEC granted the Town’s petition for a beneficial use determination (see 6 NYCRR 360-1.15), permitting the Town to use certain waste materials from the Youngs Avenue landfill as aggregate in the manufacture of asphalt at an on-site facility in connection with its landfill reclamation project. The Town awarded a municipal contract to Grimes Contracting Co., Inc. (hereinafter Grimes), to perform the landfill reclamation project which, in turn, subcontracted with GL Paving Products, Inc. (hereinafter GL Paving), to install and operate a temporary asphalt plant at the Youngs Avenue landfill.
The Town Board designated itself as lead agency for the purpose of conducting a coordinated environmental review of the siting of the asphalt plant. On March 18, 2003, the Town Board issued a negative declaration finding that the siting of the temporary asphalt plant on the Youngs Avenue landfill will not have a significant environmental impact and passed Resolution No. 301 on the same date, adopting the negative declaration. On June 3, 2003, the DEC issued an air permit to GL Paving for the asphalt plant.
On July 16, 2003, the petitioners commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding against the appellants, among others, to annul the negative declaration and enjoin the operation of the asphalt plant; in essence, the petitioner charged that the Town Board failed to take the requisite “hard look” at the environmental impacts of the proposed project. In lieu of an answer, the appellants moved to dismiss the petition upon objections in point of law that the petitioners lack standing, that the petitioner Richard Manzi, as trustee for the Joseph G. Manzi Irrevocable Trust, was barred from maintaining this proceeding under the doctrine of laches, that the proceeding was time-barred, that the petitioners failed to join necessary parties, and that the petition failed to state a cause of action. By order dated
Since the basis for this proceeding is the Town Board’s alleged noncompliance with SEQRA, the four-month statute of limitations applies (see CPLR 217 [1]; Matter of Young v Board of Trustees of Vil. of Blasdell, 89 NY2d 846, 848 [1996]; Matter of Save the Pine Bush v City of Albany, 70 NY2d 193, 202-203 [1987]). Contrary to the appellants’ contention, the limitations period did not commence until the Town Board issued a negative declaration on March 18, 2003, which concluded its SEQRA review of the siting of the temporary asphalt plant on the Youngs Avenue landfill (Stop-The-Barge v Cahill, 1 NY3d 218 [2003]; Matter of Essex County v Zagata, 91 NY2d 447 [1998]). Accordingly, this proceeding, commenced on July 16, 2003, was timely.
In this regard, we concur with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in its decision and order:
“The law is clear that strict, not substantial, compliance with SEQRA is required (Matter of King v Saratoga County Bd. of Supervisors, 89 NY2d 341 [1996]). The approval of the solid waste material from the landfill to be used in asphalt production pursuant to 6 NYCRR § 360-1.15 is not a substitute for SEQRA review, which requires a hard look at the environmental impact of the processing plant itself, not just whether or not the use of the landfill’s solid waste to produce asphalt would be hazardous to the public health, safety, or welfare. Accordingly, the essence of this petition is a SEQRA challenge to the negative declaration on the basis that it was untimely and substantively inadequate. As such, it is timely, does not require any additional parties and states a cause of action.”
We disagree with the appellants’ contention that the DEC is a necessary party to this proceeding as it did not conduct the SEQRA review (see CPLR 1001 [a]). Nevertheless, we find that Grimes, which has a municipal contract with the Town to perform the reclamation work, and GL Paving, its subcontractor hired to erect and operate the temporary asphalt plant, are necessary parties (see Matter of 27th St. Block Assn. v Dormitory Auth. of State of N.Y., 302 AD2d 155 [2002]; Matter of Amodeo v Town Bd. of Town of Marlborough, 249 AD2d 882
The Supreme Court also properly determined that the petitioner Manzi had standing to maintain this proceeding. On a motion pursuant to CPLR 7804 (f) to dismiss a petition upon an objection in point of law, only the petition is to be considered and all of its allegations are deemed to be true (see Matter of Zaidins v Hashmall, 288 AD2d 316 [2001]; Matter of De Paoli v Board of Educ., 92 AD2d 894 [1983]). The petition alleges that Manzi owns property adjacent to the Youngs Avenue landfill and that operation of the asphalt plant will expose nearby residents to hazardous air emissions, noxious odors, increased noise, and increased truck traffic. Since Manzi has alleged environmental harm that is different from that suffered by the public at large and that comes within the zone of interest of SEQRA, he has established the requisite standing to challenge the Town Board’s determination (see Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761 [1991]; Matter of Sun-Brite Car Wash v Board of Zoning & Appeals of Town of N. Hempstead, 69 NY2d 406, 414-415 [1987]; Matter of Lo Lordo v Board of Trustees of Inc. Vil. of Munsey Park, 202 AD2d 506 [1994]; Mat
We reach a different conclusion, however, with respect to the petitioners Walston and Pipczynski. The petition alleges that Walston resides at a specific address within the Town and Pipczynski resides approximately one-half mile from the asphalt plant, and that both handle asphalt in the course of their employment. Neither may avail themselves of the presumption of injury in fact because they have not demonstrated that their properties lie in close proximity to the asphalt plant (see Matter of Rediker v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Philipstown, 280 AD2d 548 [2001]; Matter of Many v Village of Sharon Springs Bd. of Trustees, 218 AD2d 845 [1995]; Matter of Casement v Town of Poughkeepsie Planning Bd., 162 AD2d 685 [1990]; see also Matter of Piela v Van Voris, 229 AD2d 94 [1997]). Therefore, they must demonstrate that they would suffer an environmental injury which is “in some way different from that of the public at large” (Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, supra at 774; see also Matter of Mobil Oil Corp. v Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 76 NY2d 428, 433 [1990]). They failed to meet this burden (Matter of Sun-Brite Car Wash v Board of Zoning & Appeals of Town of N. Hempstead, supra at 413). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have dismissed the petition insofar as asserted by Walston and Pipczynski.
The parties’ remaining contentions either are not properly before this Court or are without merit. Cozier, J.P., S. Miller, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.