Zrake v. New York City Department of Education
Cases that cite this one
10 later published cases cite this decision.
- Ahmad v. Aniolowiski (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2006)
- Northeast Steel Products, Inc. v. John Little Designs, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Lawn v. Gigliotti (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- Zaidi v. New York Building Contractors, Ltd. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- Candela v. Johnson (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- Grasso v. Tortorello (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- McHenry v. San Miguel (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- White v. Incorporated Village of Hempstead (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2007)
- Dunham v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2006)
- Sholom & Zuckerbrot Realty, LLC v. Sharif Designs, Ltd. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate an arbitration award dated June 20, 3003, the New York City Department of Education appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lewis, J.), dated June 25, 2004, which denied its motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate a prior order of the same court dated October 31, 2003, which, upon its default in appearing, granted the petitioner’s prior motion to vacate the award.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the facts and as an exercise of discretion, with costs, the motion is granted, the order dated October 31, 2003, is vacated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings in accordance herewith.
A party seeking to vacate an order entered upon its default is required to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a meritorious cause of action or defense (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Carnazza v Shoprite of Staten Is., 12 AD3d 393 [2004]; Henry v Kuveke, 9 AD3d 476 [2004]; Weekes v Karayianakis, 304 AD2d 561 [2003]; Parker v City of New York, 272 AD2d 310 [2000]). Although it is generally within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court to determine what constitutes a reasonable excuse, reversal is warranted if that discretion is improvidently exercised (see Orwell Bldg. Corp. v Bessaha, 5 AD3d 573 [2004]).
In this case, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the motion of the New York City Department of Education (hereinafter the DOE) to vacate its default. “There is evidence in [the] record that the case was originally marked ‘off because of a failure of communication involving
Accordingly, given the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits, the DOE’s lack of intent to abandon the proceeding, the lack of prejudice to the petitioner, and the fact that the DOE’s conduct was not willful, the DOE should have been permitted to file its cross motion and have its contentions considered on the merits (see Henry v Kuveke, supra at 479). H. Miller, J.P., Cozier, Rivera and Skelos, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.