Vasquez v. Wood
Cases that cite this one
11 later published cases cite this decision.
- City of New York v. College Point Sports Ass'n (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- Pool Doctor Mgt. Serv., Inc. v. Board of Mgrs. of the Meadowlands Estates Condominium, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2023)
- Pitt v. Feagles (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2021)
- Lupo v. Miranda (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2020)
- Elliott v. Grant (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- Shaw v. Bluepers Family Billiards (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Carmenate v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- Levy v. Kung Sit Huie (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- Pi Ju Tang v. St. Francis Hospital (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2007)
- Goldweber & Hershkowitz v. Digsby (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2006)
- Marinelli v. Sroka (New York Supreme Court 2005)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries and
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the appellant’s motion which was to dismiss the first cause of action insofar as asserted against it and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and the first cause of action is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant.
We agree with the appellant that the terms of CPLR 213-b do not extend the statutes of limitations that are applicable to the plaintiff’s wrongful death and “survival” causes of action insofar as asserted against it (see EPTL 5-4.1; CPLR 214 [5]). The appellant was not convicted of any crime as a result of the accident that gave rise to this action, and CPLR 213-b, by its plain terms, does not apply (see Boice v Burnett, 245 AD2d 980, 981; Villanueva v Comparetto 180 AD2d 627, 629 [1992] [construing CPLR 215 (8)]; Jordan v Britton 128 AD2d 315, 320 [1987] [construing EPTL 5-4.1 (2)]; cf. Alford v St. Nicholas Holding Corp. 218 AD2d 622).
However, the plaintiffs cause of action to recover damages for wrongful death was timely interposed against the appellant (see CPLR 205 [a]; Hernandez v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 78 NY2d 687 [1991]). On August 12, 1998, the plaintiff commenced a prior action against the defendants in which she asserted a cause of action to recover damages for wrongful death. By order dated November 2, 2001, the Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss that action, as it was commenced prior to the issuance of letters of administration to the plaintiff, and thus she lacked the capacity to sue. The dismissal was without prejudice to the commencement of a new action based on the same occurrence within six months of service of a copy of the court’s order, with notice of entry, pursuant to CPLR 205 (a). The instant action was commenced within that six-month period.
The plaintiffs cause of action to recover damages for wrongful death was timely interposed on August 12, 1998, the date the prior action was commenced, in light of the infancy toll recognized in Hernandez v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. (supra at 694). The appellant raised no issue concerning this aspect of the Supreme Court’s order in its main brief, and thus
The decedent’s son, born after his death, was his only distributee. Thus, no one was qualified or eligible to receive letters of administration until a guardian was actually appointed for him (see EPTL 4-1.1 [a] [3]; EPTL 5-4.5; SCPA 103 [27]; 707 [1] [a]; 1001 [2]). Since this did not occur until May 19, 1999, when the plaintiff, the infant’s mother, was appointed as his guardian, the wrongful death cause of action was timely interposed upon the filing of the prior complaint on August 12, 1998 (see Hernandez v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., supra; see also Weed v St. Joseph’s Hosp., 245 AD2d 713, 714 [1997]).
As noted, the wrongful death cause of action timely asserted in the previous action was dismissed because of the plaintiffs lack of capacity to sue. Thus this action, commenced within the required six-month period, was timely commenced due to the toll of CPLR 205 (a) (see Carrick v Central Gen. Hosp., 51 NY2d 242, 245-246 [1980]). H. Miller, J.P., Ritter, Goldstein and Crane, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.