Old Saratoga Square Partnership v. Compton
Cases that cite this one
8 later published cases cite this decision.
- NAVCAN.DC, Inc. v. Rinde (District Court, S.D. New York 2024)
- Herczl v. Feinsilver (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- DiCenzo v. Mone (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2021)
- Greenberg v. Grace Plaza Nursing & Rehabilitation Ctr. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2019)
- Ernest & Maryanna Jeremias Family Partnership, L.P. v. Sadykov (Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York 2015)
- TDD Irrevocable Trust v. J & A Saporta Realty Corp. (New York Supreme Court 2014)
- In re the Estate of Walsh (New York Surrogate's Court 2007)
- Saunders v. Bryant's Towing (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2006)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (Ferradino, J.), entered February 11, 2004 in Saratoga County, which, inter alia, granted a motion by defendant Richard De Vail to disqualify plaintiffs counsel from representing plaintiff, and (2) from an order of said court, entered October 7, 2004, which, inter alia, denied plaintiffs motion for leave to renew and/or reargue.
Plaintiff is a partnership in which attorney Donna Wardlaw is a partner. Defendant John Compton (hereinafter defendant) and his son, Lee Compton, leased premises owned by plaintiff in the City of Saratoga Springs, Saratoga County, where they operated a bar. The lease was later assigned solely to Lee Compton, with defendant’s notarized signature appearing as guarantor for the lease on a document executed the same day as the assignment. Lee Compton subsequently defaulted and allegedly cannot be found. Defendant asserted that the notarized signature on the guarantee was not his signature. Plaintiff commenced this action against defendant and Richard De Vail, the attorney who notarized defendant’s signature on the guarantee. Prior to disclosure, De Vail moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and, alternatively, permission to amend his answer to assert a statute of limitations defense and for removal of Wardlaw as plaintiffs counsel. Defendant also moved for summary judgment. Supreme Court found that Wardlaw should be disqualified from representing plaintiff because she was an advocate-witness. All other relief requested by the parties was denied, as was the relevant portion of the subsequent motion by plaintiff to renew and/or reargue.
The advocate-witness rule disqualifies an attorney from representing a client when the attorney’s “testimony is ‘necessary’ and he or she ‘ought to be called as a witness’ ” (Skiff-Murray v Murray, 3 AD3d 610, 611 [2004], quoting Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-102 [a] [22 NYCRR 1200.21
Mercure, J.P., Carpinello and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order entered February 11, 2004 is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as granted defendant Richard De Vail’s motion to have Donna Wardlaw disqualified from acting as attorney for plaintiff; motion denied; and, as so modified, affirmed. Ordered that the appeal from the order entered October 7, 2004 is dismissed, without costs.
Review of that subsequent motion reveals that it was in the nature of re-argument, and no appeal lies from the denial of a motion to reargue (see Nichols v Turner, 6 AD3d 1009, 1010 [2004]). Thus, plaintiffs appeal of the October 7, 2004 order is dismissed (see O’Brien v O’Brien, 16 AD3d 1015, 1016 [2005]).
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.