New Colony Homes, Inc. v. Long Island Property Group, LLC
Cases that cite this one
17 later published cases cite this decision.
- Gaia House Mezz LLC v. State Street Bank & Trust Co. (2d Cir. 2013)
- Kaiser-Haidri v. Battery Place Green, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Condado Plaza Acquisition LLC (United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York 2020)
- Condado Plaza Acquisition LLC (United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York 2020)
- Thor Properties, LLC v. Willspring Holdings LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- Thor Properties, LLC v. Willspring Holdings LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- 131 Heartland Blvd. Corp. v. C.J. Jon Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- J. D'Addario & Co. v. Embassy Industries, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Bank of America v. Petit (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Willsey v. Gjuraj (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- Town House Stock LLC v. Coby Housing Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- Rufeh v. Schwartz (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- Mayfield v. Koroghli (Nev. 2008)
- Verolla v. Beechwood Carmen Building Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2007)
- Ramnarain v. Ramnarain (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2006)
- Ramnarain v. Ramnarain (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2006)
- Richmond v. Miele (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2006)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
In an action for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property, the plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Burke, J.), dated September 28, 2004, as denied its motion for summary judgment and granted those branches of the motion of the defendant Long Island Property Group, LLC, which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it and for summary judgment on its counterclaim for a judgment- declaring that it is entitled to retain the plaintiffs deposit of $180,000, and the defendant Long Island Property Group, LLC, cross-appeals from so much of the same order as denied that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment on its counterclaim for a judgment declaring that it is entitled to retain a $60,000 payment made by the plaintiff.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The contract for the sale of real property at issue here required the plaintiff purchaser to make two down payments to the defendant seller. The first, in the amount of $180,000, was due upon execution and delivery of the contract, and the second down payment, in the amount of $100,000, was payable “on or before One Hundred Eighty (180) days after the execution and delivery of this Contract, TIME BEING OF THE ESSENCE” (emphasis in original).
It is undisputed that the purchaser did not make the second down payment on or before 180 days after the execution and delivery of the contract, and that the seller rejected the purchaser’s attempted late tender of the second down payment. When a contract states that time is of the essence, the parties are obligated to comply strictly with its terms (see Milad v
Therefore, the Supreme Court properly denied the purchaser’s motion for summary judgment on its complaint for specific performance, and granted that branch of the seller’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Furthermore, the Supreme Court properly awarded the seller summary judgment on its counterclaim seeking a declaration that it is entitled to retain the purchaser’s first down payment (see Maxton Bldrs. v Lo Galbo, 68 NY2d 373, 378 [1986] [“vendee who defaults on a real estate contract without lawful excuse, cannot recover the down payment”]).
In addition, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the seller’s motion which was for summary judgment on its counterclaim for a declaration that it was also entitled to retain an additional $60,000 payment made to it by the purchaser. This payment is only obliquely referenced in the parties’ contract, and the seller failed to establish-that, pursuant to the contract, in the event of the purchaser’s default, it was entitled to retain this payment, which apparently did not constitute a down payment, but rather was paid in addition to the purchase price. Schmidt, J.E, Santucci, Luciano and Spolzino, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.