Bray v. Marsolais
Opinion of the Court
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Spargo, J.), entered September 6, 2005 in Albany County, which
In June and July 2005, a citizen petition proposing two amendments to the City of Albany Charter was circulated in the City of Albany pursuant to Municipal Home Rule Law § 37. On July 15, 2005, the petition, containing eight volumes with 3,675 signatures, was then presented to respondent (see Municipal Home Rule Law § 24 [1] [a]; § 37 [5]). Upon his examination, respondent reported to the City of Albany Common Council by certificate that the petition was insufficient in that it contained only 2,909 valid signatures (see Municipal Home Rule Law § 37 [5]), 122 signatures short of the 3,031 required in order for it to be placed on the ballot in the next general election (see Municipal Home Rule Law § 24 [1] [a]). The certificate specifically set forth the reasons underlying the invalidity of each of the rejected 766 signatures (see Municipal Home Rule Law § 37 [5]). Petitioner thereafter commenced this proceeding seeking to validate 224 of the 766 invalidated signatures. In his affirmation in opposition, respondent, among other things, identified 170 signatures which were counted as valid but which he now sought to find invalid.
A three-day hearing was thereafter held during the course of which Supreme Court sua sponte questioned whether signatures on certain pages of the petition were valid because the subscribing witnesses on those pages lived outside the City of Albany. Eventually, the parties were asked to research and prepare argument on the residency issue. Although Supreme Court found 136 of the 224 signatures valid
Initially, we find that Supreme Court should not have raised the residency issue sua sponte (see Salesian Socy. v Village of Ellenville, 41 NY2d 521 [1977]; Matter of Isabella v Hotaling, 207 AD2d 648, 649-650 [1994], lv denied 84 NY2d 801 [1994]), especially since the issue had nothing to do with the subject matter jurisdiction of the court (see Matter of Fry v Village of Tarrytown, 89 NY2d 714, 722 [1997]). Respondent, who adopted this argument during the course of the three-day hearing, failed to raise this issue in his responsive pleading as a ground for invalidating any signatures, despite the fact that the certificate clearly indicated that the citizen petition contained 316 signatures collected by non-city residents. Furthermore, the parties should be bound by a stipulation entered into at the beginning of these proceedings, namely, that there were only 766 signatures invalidated for reasons other than the residency issue raised by the court (see Nishman v De Marco, 62 NY2d 926, 929 [1984]; Mitchell v New York Hosp., 61 NY2d 208, 214 [1984]).
Moreover, even if Supreme Court had the authority to raise this issue sua sponte, the holding in Lerman v Board of Elections in City of N.Y. (supra), which has been adopted by the Court of Appeals in Matter of La Brake v Dukes (96 NY2d 913 [2001], affg 286 AD2d 554 [2001]), is controlling. We are unpersuaded that Lerman is distinguishable on the ground that it dealt with the designating petition process under Election Law § 6-132, while the form of the petition here is governed by Election Law § 6-140 as required by Municipal Home Rule Law § 24 (1) (a). For purposes of the residency requirement, no justifiable grounds exist to distinguish designating petitions and nominating petitions (see Chou v New York State Bd. of Elections, 332 F Supp 2d 510 [2004]). Significantly, a notary public or a commissioner of deeds is qualified to witness the petition in lieu of the signed statement of a subscribing witness without the requirement that either live in the City of Albany (see Election Law § 6-140 [2]).
Mercure, J.P., Crew III, Peters, Carpinello and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs, and petition granted.
. Twenty-one of the signatures which Supreme Court declared valid were on pages where the subscribing witnesses lived outside of the City of Albany.
. Some of these signatures had already been declared invalid by respondent and were not reinstated by Supreme Court on other grounds.
. Although respondent also filed a notice of appeal, he is not an aggrieved party having succeeded in getting petitioner’s application dismissed. The arguments he raises in his brief, however, can be considered as alternative grounds for affirmance.
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