Bass v. Union Carbide Corp.
Opinion of the Court
In 12 related actions to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the appeals, as limited by the appellants’ brief, are from so much of 12 orders of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Lefkowitz, J.), all dated August 8, 2003, as granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing as time-barred certain causes of action asserted by Stanley Lewis and Jean Staci, plaintiffs in Action No. 1, Ramona Burger, Connie Tanguay, Wendy Lee Stous, Daniel Brugger, Alan Richard Maynard, Jr., Walter Cemel III, Penny Russell, and Susan Brown, plaintiffs in Action No. 2, Arthur W. Quick, a
Ordered that the appeals insofar as taken against the defendant International Business Machines Corporation in Action Nos. 1 through 7 and 9 through 11 are dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,
Ordered that the orders are affirmed insofar as appealed from with respect to the remaining defendants, with one bill of costs to the remaining defendants.
By stipulation of discontinuance filed March 3, 2005, the plaintiffs discontinued their actions insofar as asserted against the defendant International Business Machines Corporation (hereinafter IBM). Accordingly their appeals in Action Nos. 1 through 7 and 9 through 11, insofar as taken against IBM, must be dismissed as academic.
The Supreme Court properly dismissed the causes of action to the extent indicated in its orders, insofar as asserted against the remaining defendants, as the statute of limitations expired before the commencement of the actions (see CPLR 214-c [2]). Contrary to the appellants’ contention, the motion was not prematurely granted without affording them adequate discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]). The appellants failed to demonstrate that additional discovery was needed to establish that their claims were not time-barred (see Neryaev v Solon, 6 AD3d 510 [2004]; Town of Hempstead v Incorporated Vil. of Atl. Beach, 278 AD2d 308, 310 [2000]). The mere hope by a party opposing summary judgment that it will uncover evidence that will prove that the action is not time-barred is insufficient under CPLR 3212 (f) (see Town of Hempstead v Incorporated Vil. of Atl. Beach, supra).
The Supreme Court properly denied the cross motion made by certain plaintiffs for leave to amend the complaints to allege the applicability of the tolling provisions of CPLR 214-c (4) and 42 USC § 9658. The amendments were palpably insufficient because the movants failed to aver facts demonstrating the applicability of the tolling provisions in either statute (see Burger v Union Carbide Corp., 304 AD2d 700, 701 [2003]; see also Butt v New York Med. Coll., 7 AD3d 744, 745 [2004]; Pompa v Burroughs Wellcome Co., 259 AD2d 18, 22 [1999]; Becton v Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 706 So 2d 1134, 1141 [Ala 1997]).
The appellants’ remaining contentions are without merit. Florio, J.P., Crane, Mastro and Lifson, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.