Trio Asbestos Removal Corp. v. Marinelli
Opinion of the Court
Ordered that the order dated February 23, 2005 is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting the petitioner’s motion to confirm the valuation and substituting therefor a provision denying the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Trio Asbestos Removal Corp. (hereinafter the petitioner) brought an action for specific performance of an agreement between it and the appellant, Nicholas Marinelli, for the sale to the petitioner of Marinelli’s shares in the petitioner. The Supreme Court, by order dated March 30, 2004, inter alia, directed specific performance of the agreement, with Marinelli’s shares to be valued as of August 1, 2003, by a method set forth in the parties’ shareholders agreement. Pursuant to section 3.4 (d) of the shareholders agreement, valuation of shares in the petitioner was to be determined “[b]y the accountants servicing the Corporation using normal and usual accounting practices.”
Subsequently, the petitioner moved to confirm a valuation of Marinelli’s shares and for specific performance of the parties’ agreement for the sale of the shares at the price determined by the valuation. The valuation the petitioner sought to confirm
The Supreme Court erred in confirming the valuation and directing specific performance of the agreement for the sale of Marinelli’s shares at the share price determined by the valuation. “It is axiomatic that a contract is to be interpreted so as to give effect to the intention of the parties as expressed in the unequivocal language employed” (Matter of Wallace v 600 Partners Co., 86 NY2d 543, 548 [1995] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the relevant language in section 3.4 (d) of the shareholders agreement setting forth the method of valuation cannot be interpreted as permitting the petitioner’s accountants to retain an outside expert to perform the valuation. Rather, that language expressly provides that the petitioner’s regular accountants actually determine a valuation of shares themselves. That the petitioner’s accountants wholly relied on the outside expert’s report in setting forth their opinion as to the value of Marinelli’s shares, and formed no independent opinion of their own, is evidenced by their letter to the petitioner advising it of the valuation, which is dated the same day as the expert’s report. Moreover, the affidavit of a partner in the petitioner’s accountants’ firm provided no support for his contention that his firm determined the value of the shares using normal and usual accounting methods, as called for by the shareholders agreement.
In light of our determination, we do not address Marinelli’s contention that the court should have granted him access to the petitioner’s books and records, which he sought on his cross motion only in the alternative.
We do not reach Marinelli’s further contention that a 2003 form K-l issued to him by the petitioner should be amended and that he is entitled to share in the petitioner’s 2003 profits as that issue was not addressed by the Supreme Court in the order appealed from.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.