Village of Pomona v. Town of Ramapo
Opinion of the Court
Ordered that the order dated August 10, 2006 is reversed, on the law, and that branch of the motion of the defendants Town of Ramapo and Town of Ramapo Water District which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (3) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them for lack of standing is granted; and it is further,
Ordered that the appeal from the order dated January 23, 2007 is dismissed as academic; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the appellants, payable by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff Village of Pomona is an incorporated village, a portion of which lies within the geographical boundaries of the defendant Town of Ramapo. The defendant Town of Ramapo Water District (hereinafter the Water District) was created prior to 1975, and encompasses the same geographic area as the Town. The Water District constitutes a taxing district empowered to fund the cost of providing water to and maintaining the various fire hydrants within the Water District. Residential real property owners in the Town, including the portion of the Village within the Town, receive an annual property tax bill containing, among other itemized charges, a Water District tax. However, Village residential property owners also receive an annual Village tax bill which contains, inter alia, a charge for the fire hydrants located in the portion of the Village lying within the geographical boundaries of the Town and the Water District.
The instant action was commenced on or about September 30, 2005 to recover the sum of $287,149.32 allegedly overpaid by the Village for water services from January 1, 1975 through 2003. In November 2005 the Town and the Water District moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (3) and (5), asserting that the Village lacked capacity and standing to sue, and that the action was time-barred. In its order dated August 10, 2006, the Supreme Court determined that the Village had both standing and capacity, and that the six-year period of limitations for contract actions governed the Village’s cause of action. We reverse.
The Village lacks standing to maintain this action insofar as asserted against the Town and the Water District since its actual objective—notwithstanding the Village’s characterization of it—is to recoup taxpayer funds (see Incorporated Vil. of Northport v Town of Huntington, 199 AD2d 242 [1993]). According to the Village, the gravamen of its cause of action is that, once it determined in 2003 that United Water had, since 1975, been erroneously billing it for the provision of water to hydrants within the Village, rather than billing the Town or the Water District, the Village was entitled to recover that sum
Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of the motion of the Town and the Water District which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (3) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them for lack of standing.
The appellants’ remaining contentions have been rendered academic or are without merit, and Village’s contention that the order dated August 10, 2006 is not appealable as of right is without merit (see CPLR 5701 [a] [2] [iv], [v]; Rendelman v Southside Hosp., 141 AD2d 521 [1988]; see also Town of Austerlitz v Dugwest Assoc., LLC, 24 AD3d 847, 848 [2005]). Spolzino, J.P., Ritter, Lifson and Angiolillo, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.