Duarte v. Community Realty Corp.
Cases that cite this one
7 later published cases cite this decision.
- Byrd v. 2015 Caton Avenue, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- S.H. v. Neighborhood Partnership Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2018)
- Turner v. Davis (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- Turner v. Davis (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- Flores v. Cathedral Properties LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Flores v. Cathedral Properties LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Kaur v. Velez (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Pursuant to Local Law No. 1 (2004) of the City of New York (hereinafter Local Law 1), the owner of a multiple dwelling must remove or cover paint containing specified hazardous levels of lead in any apartment in which a child six years of age or younger resides (see Administrative Code of City of NY former § 27-2013 [h], now §§ 27-2056.3, 27-2056.18; Juarez v Wavecrest Mgt. Team, 88 NY2d 628 [1996]; O’Neal v New York City Hous. Auth., 4 AD3d 348 [2004]). Violation of Local Law 1, however, does not result in absolute liability (see Juarez v Wavecrest Mgt. Team, supra at 643). To impose liability on a landlord for a lead-based paint condition, a plaintiff must establish that the landlord had actual or constructive notice of the condition for such a period of time that, in the exercise of reasonable care, it should have been remedied (see Juarez v Wavecrest Mgt. Team, supra at 646). In multiple dwellings located in the City of New York, constructive notice of a hazardous condition is presumed where the landlord has notice that a child under the age of six resides in the unit (see Juarez v Wavecrest Mgt. Team, supra at 647; Chadwick v Sabin, 304 AD2d 603, 603-604 [2003]).
Even if the defendants did not establish, prima facie, that the building was not a multiple dwelling, they nevertheless submitted evidence sufficient to establish that they did not have notice that a child under the age of six resided at the subject apartment before the infant plaintiff allegedly sustained any injuries. In opposition to the defendants’ prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on this ground, the plaintiffs failed to submit evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants had such notice. Miller, J.P, Mastro, Lifson and Garni, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.