Teachers Insurance Annuity Ass'n of America v. Cohen's Fashion Optical of 485 Lexington Avenue, Inc.
Cases that cite this one
12 later published cases cite this decision.
- Remora Capital S.A. v. Dukan (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2019)
- Metropolitan Commercial Bank v. Levy (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- Rossetti v. Ambulatory Surgery Ctr. of Brooklyn, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2015)
- Baby Phat Holding Co., LLC v. Kellwood Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- Triad International Corp. v. Cameron Industries, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- Baby Phat Holding Co., LLC v. Kellwood Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- Tommy Lee Handbags Manufacturing Ltd. v. 1948 Corp. (District Court, S.D. New York 2013)
- Roohan v. First Guarantee Mortgage, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Roohan v. First Guarantee Mortgage, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Popowich v. Korman (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
- Gateway I Group, Inc. v. Park Avenue Physicians, P.C. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- Fantazia International Corp. v. CPL Furs New York, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Edmead, J.), entered January 5, 2007, which, insofar as appealed from, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the first and second causes of action seeking to pierce the corporate veil; denied defendants’motion to dismiss the fourth cause of action insofar as it alleges
The court correctly denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ first and second cause of action seeking to pierce the corporate veil of defendant Cohen’s Fashion Optical of 485 Lexington Avenue, Inc. (C-485) and hold the corporate parent, Cohen Fashion Optical, Inc. (C-Parent), liable for the breach of lease. In order to pierce the corporate veil, plaintiffs must show that (1) C-Parent exercised complete domination and control with respect to the transaction attacked, and (2) such domination was used to commit a fraud or wrong against them (see Matter of Morris v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 82 NY2d 135, 141 [1993]). Here, plaintiffs allege that C-Parent negotiated the lease on behalf of C-485 as tenant, while holding itself out as the real party in interest, and, in direct violation of the lease and without any disclosure to plaintiff landlord, installed a franchisee to operate the business, leaving a judgment-proof C-485 an empty shell with no assets. This is sufficient to state a claim to pierce the corporate veil (see CC Ming [USA] Ltd. Partnership v Champagne Video, 232 AD2d 202 [1996]; Fern, Inc. v Adjmi, 197 AD2d 444 [1994]; Ventresca Realty Corp. v Houlihan, 41 AD3d 707 [2007]).
The court also correctly denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on these claims. Defendants’ evidence does not conclusively establish that plaintiffs knew or should have known that C-485 was an empty shell against which they would have no recourse. The documentary evidence submitted by defendants actually lends some support to plaintiffs’ position that C-Parent deliberately concealed this arrangement. Also, the affidavit of C-Parent’s president, that he orally informed some unknown person at plaintiffs’ predecessor of this arrangement, in direct violation of the express, written terms of the lease, is insufficient to grant defendants summary judgment.
The court also correctly sustained plaintiffs’ claim against Cohen’s Fashion Optical of 500 Lexington Avenue, Inc. (C-500) -and Cohen’s Fashion Optical of 47th Street, Inc. (the franchisee) under the continuity of business or de facto merger doctrine.
Although plaintiffs sufficiently allege all of the other elements of fraud in the inducement, they fail properly to allege damages that are not recoverable under the breach of contract claim (see 34-35th Corp. v 1-10 Indus. Assoc., 2 AD3d 711, 712 [2003]). All of plaintiffs’ proposed damages are essentially claims for lost rent under the lease (compare Deerfield Communications Corp. v Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc., 68 NY2d 954, 956 [1986]). Thus, the court should have denied plaintiffs’ cross motion to the extent that it sought to add the seventh cause of action for fraud in the inducement. Concur—Andrias, J.P., Saxe, Nardelli, McGuire and Malone, JJ.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.