People v. Coffey
Cases that cite this one
6 later published cases cite this decision.
- People v. Lyons (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
- People v. Cohen (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
- COOKE, JAMAL, PEOPLE v (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- People v. Cooke (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- People v. Cooke (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- People v. Malloy (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Appeal by the defendant from an order of the County Court, Suffolk County (Braslow, J.), dated January 11, 2005, which, after a hearing, designated him a level three sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the defendant is reclassified as a level two sex offender.
Although a court is empowered to exercise its discretion and depart from the presumptive risk level based upon the facts in the record (see People v Hines, 24 AD3d 524, 525 [2005]; People v Girup, 9 AD3d 913 [2004]; People v Guaman, 8 AD3d 545 [2004]), it has been recognized that “utilization of the risk assessment instrument will generally ‘result in the proper classification in most cases so that departures will be the exception not the rule’ ” (People v Guaman, 8 AD3d 545 [2004], quoting Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 4 [1997 ed]; see People v Burgos, 39 AD3d 520 [2007]; People v Inghilleri, 21 AD3d 404 [2005]). A departure from the presumptive risk level is warranted only where “there exists an aggravating or mitigating factor of a kind or to a degree, not otherwise adequately taken into account by the guidelines” (Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 4 [1997 ed]; see People v Burgos, 39 AD3d at 520; People v Hegazy, 25 AD3d 675 [2006]; People v Inghilleri, 21 AD3d at 404; People v Guaman, 8 AD3d 545 [2004]). There must be clear and convincing evidence of a special circumstance to warrant a departure from the presumptive risk level (see People v Burgos, 39 AD3d at 520).
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.