Schumacher v. Town of East Hampton
Cases that cite this one
11 later published cases cite this decision.
- Caspian Realty, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- Matter of 278, LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of E. Hampton (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2018)
- Matter of Wambold v. Village of Southampton Zoning Bd. of Appeals (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Matter of Quintana v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Inc. Vil. of Muttontown (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- Matter of Birch Tree Partners, LLC v. Nature Conservancy (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- Daneri v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Southold (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Daneri v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Southold (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Campbell v. Town of Mount Pleasant Zoning Board of Appeals (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Layne v. Eastchester Planning Board (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
- Moy v. Board of Town Trustees (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- Rosasco v. Village of Head of the Harbor (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
Local zoning boards have broad discretion in considering applications for variances, and judicial review is limited to determining whether the action taken by the board was illegal, arbitrary or an abuse of discretion (see Matter of Ifrah v Utschig, 98 NY2d 304, 308 [2002]; Matter of Filipowski v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Vil. of Greenwood Lake, 38 AD3d 545, 546 [2007]). Courts may set aside a zoning board determination only where the record reveals that the board acted illegally or arbitrarily, or abused its discretion, or that it merely succumbed to generalized community pressure (see Matter of Pecoraro v Board of Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 2 NY3d 608, 613 [2004]; Matter of Ifrah v Utschig, 98 NY2d at 308; Matter of Marro v Libert, 40 AD3d 1100, 1101 [2007]; Matter of Josato, Inc. v Wright, 35 AD3d 470, 471 [2006], lv denied 9 NY3d 805 [2007]).
In determining whether to grant an application for an area variance, a zoning board must engage in a balancing test weighing the benefit to the applicant against the detriment to the health, safety, and welfare of the neighborhood or community (see Town Law § 267-b [3] [b]; Matter of Ifrah v Utschig, 98 NY2d at 307; Matter of Hannett v Scheyer, 37 AD3d 603, 604 [2007]). The zoning board is also required to consider: (1) whether an undesirable change will be produced in the character of the neighborhood or a detriment to nearby properties if the
Here, as the Supreme Court correctly determined, the determination of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of East Hampton, sued herein as Town of East Hampton, New York Zoning Board of Appeals (hereinafter the Zoning Board) to deny the area variance application was arbitrary (see Matter of Easy Home Program v Trotta, 276 AD2d 553 [2000]). A review of the record reveals that the Zoning Board improperly succumbed to community pressure, since there was no evidence that granting the proposed variances would have an undesirable effect on the character of the neighborhood, adversely impact physical and environmental conditions, or otherwise result in a detriment to the health, safety, and welfare of the neighborhood or community (see Matter of Gonzalez v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Putnam Val., 3 AD3d 496, 497 [2004]; Matter of Easy Home Program v Trotta, 276 AD2d 553 [2000]; Matter of Riklis v Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 243 AD2d 482 [1997]). In fact, not only were all of the surrounding lots nonconforming in terms of the applicable requirements for setbacks from wetlands, but, by constructing a new home the petitioners would actually increase the distance between the wetlands and their residence. Moreover, the alternatives suggested by the Zoning Board were not feasible (see Matter of Easy Home Program v Trotta, 276 AD2d 553 [2000]; Matter of Witzl v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Berne, 256 AD2d 775, 777 [1998]). The petitioners had already reduced the size of their proposed residence, and, as the Town Planning Department recognized in their environmental assessment form, a further reduction would not substantially improve wetland setbacks. The Zoning Board’s conclusion that the petitioners could undertake a more limited expansion of the existing residence was irrational, given that such a proposal would only serve to decrease the setbacks from the wetlands.
Likewise, the Zoning Board’s determination denying the petitioners’ application for a Natural Resources Special Permit was arbitrary (see Matter of Bond v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of E. Hampton, 272 AD2d 612, 613 [2000]; cf. Matter of
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly annulled the Zoning Board’s determination, granted the petition, and directed the Zoning Board to grant the area variances and the natural resources special permit. Prudenti, P.J., Mastro, Santucci and Lifson, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.