People v. Walker
Cases that cite this one
13 later published cases cite this decision.
- People v. Jacobs (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- People v. Modica (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- People v. Lehmann (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2019)
- People v. Daley (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2018)
- People v. Santiago (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- People v. Morrison (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- People v. Lacewell (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- People v. Lacewell (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- People v. Charlton (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
- People v. Herron (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- People v. Woodard (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- People v. Foy (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- People v. Pasquarelli (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The defendant pleaded guilty to rape in the first degree, and later was assigned a presumptive risk level three sex offender designation {see Correction Law § 168-a). In its risk assessment instrument (hereinafter the RAI), the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders (hereinafter the Board) indicated that a downward departure from level three to level two was warranted. By way of explanation, in its case summary, the Board stated that the defendant “was involved in one incident against the victim and has no such other known incidents.” Following a hearing, the County Court designated the defendant a level three sex offender, and declined to make a downward departure to level two. We affirm.
Generally, the RAI “will result in the proper classification in most cases so that departures will be the exception—not the rule” (Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 4 [2006 ed] [hereinafter Guidelines and Commentary]; see People v Williams, 19 AD3d 388 [2005]; People v Guarnan, 8 AD3d 545 [2004]). A departure from the presumptive risk level is warranted only where “there exists an aggravating or mitigating factor of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the guidelines” (Guidelines and Commentary at 4; see People v Williams, 19 AD3d 388 [2005]; People v Guarnan, 8 AD3d 545 [2004]). There must be clear and convincing evidence of the existence of a special circumstance to warrant any departure (see People v Valentine, 15 AD3d 463, 463-464 [2005]).
The defendant contends that the County Court improvidently exercised its discretion in rejecting the Board’s recommendation of a downward departure. We disagree. The court was not bound by the Board’s recommendation and, in the exercise of its discretion, was entitled to depart from that recommendation and
The defendant failed to prove any mitigating factor or special circumstance which would warrant a downward departure. Accordingly, the County Court providently exercised its discretion in designating the defendant a level three sex offender (see People v Williams, 19 AD3d 388 [2005]). Ritter, J.P. Florio, Miller and Dillon, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.