Emigrant Bank v. UBS Real Estate Securities, Inc.
Cases that cite this one
9 later published cases cite this decision.
- Bed Bath & Beyond Inc. v. Ibex Construction, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- In re Westinghouse Elec. Co. (United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York 2018)
- DCR Mortgage VI Sub I, LLC v. Peoples United Financial, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- Keitel v. Etrade Financial Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- Stonehill Capital Management LLC v. Bank of the West (N.Y. 2016)
- White Winston Select Asset Funds, LLC v. Intercloud Systems, Inc. (3d Cir. 2015)
- Barkany Asset Recovery & Management v. Southwest Securities Inc. (New York Supreme Court 2013)
- Genger v. Genger (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Thome v. Alexander & Louisa Calder Foundation (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The documents did not conclusively contradict the pleading, and it was thus premature to dismiss the contract claim (see Foster v Kovner, 44 AD3d 23, 28 [2007]; Richbell Info. Servs. v Jupiter Partners, 309 AD2d 288, 289-290 [2003]). “Subject to” in the bid form did not unmistakably condition assent on the execution of a definitive agreement at some later juncture. Any later agreement to be executed was limited to terms substantially the same as those in the agreement posted on the bidding Web site and was to contain the standard industry representations and warranties as set forth in the conditions added by defendant on the bid form. “Subject to” language in a subsequent UBS commitment memorandum was similarly limited to such
The authorities relied upon by the motion court for the proposition that the bid was conditioned on the execution of a more definitive binding agreement are distinguishable since they involve unequivocal reservations of assent. In Prospect St. Ventures I, LLC v Eclipsys Solutions Corp. (23 AD3d 213 [2005]), the letter agreement was expressly conditioned on the execution of a definitive agreement, and the intent of the parties not to be bound was further manifest from references to a “proposed” commitment and a “proposed” transaction, and from an express statement that the letter (in the record in that case) was “not a commitment.” In Aksman v Xiongwei Ju (21 AD3d 260, 260 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 715 [2005]), the opening line of the letter of intent stated that it was “a basis for conducting business” and repeatedly emphasized that it would be replaced by a “contract,” thereby reflecting the intent to enter into a binding agreement at a later date.
The agreement was reasonably certain as to its material terms (see Cobble Hill Nursing Home v Henry & Warren Corp., 74 NY2d 475, 482 [1989], cert denied 498 US 816 [1990]). The bid price was sufficiently definite as a percentage of the value of the fixed rate mortgages in the pool. There is an issue of fact as to whether subsequent price adjustments were both immaterial and the subject of renegotiations of already agreed-upon terms. That the portfolio’s mortgages could be paid off or defaulted from day to day, leaving its composition in flux after submission of the bid, did not render the bid indefinite.
Dismissal of the cause of action for breach of the duty to negotiate (see generally Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v Arcadian Corp., 884 F2d 69, 72 [2d Cir 1989]) was flawed for the same reason as dismissal of the contract claim. Whether defendant breached such duty presented a question of fact (see Goodstein Constr. Corp. v City of New York, 67 NY2d 990 [1986]). The promissory estoppel cause of action was similarly viable, since— contrary to the motion court’s conclusion that there was no binding agreement—there was a clear and unambiguous promise that could give rise to reasonable detrimental reliance (see e.g. Esquire Radio & Elecs., Inc. v Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 804 F2d 787, 793 [2d Cir 1986]).
The cause of action for negligent misrepresentation was
The request for specific performance was properly dismissed for failure to set forth nonconclusory allegations as to why an award of damages would be inadequate.
We have considered plaintiffs’ other contentions and find them unavailing. Concur—Saxe, J.P., Gonzalez, Buckley and Acosta, JJ. [See 2007 NY Slip Op 30291(U).]
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.