Hartofil v. McCourt & Trudden Funeral Home, Inc.
Cases that cite this one
15 later published cases cite this decision.
- Nichols-Sisson v. Windstar Airport Service, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Nichols-Sisson v. Windstar Airport Service, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Nachamie v. County of Nassau (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- Tigue v. City of Newburgh (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2022)
- Drummond v. 450 Partners LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2022)
- Drummond v. 450 Partners LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2022)
- Rappel v. Wincoma Homeowners Assn. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2015)
- Khaimova v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Khaimova v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Holmes v. Town of Oyster Bay (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Perales v. First Columbia 1200 NSR, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Grier v. 35-63 Realty, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
- Antenozzi v. Village of Spencerport (New York Supreme Court 2009)
- Peluso v. ERM (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- Smirnova v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
After depositions had been conducted, McCourt moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it and the Village and F.D. Contracting separately moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against each of them. While the motions were pending, the plaintiff voluntarily discontinued his action against the Village. The Supreme Court granted McCourt’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that it had no duty to maintain and repair the brickwork in front of its premises pursuant to the Code of the Village of Farmingdale § 81-3.1 because the brickwork was not part of the sidewalk. However, the court denied F.D. Contracting’s motion, finding that there was an issue of fact as to whether it could be held liable on the theory that the contract specifications for the brickwork were so obviously defective that a contractor of ordinary skill and prudence would not have performed the work. The court also denied that branch of the Village’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cross claim of F.D. Contracting insofar as asserted against it.
As a general rule, “[a] builder or contractor is justified in relying upon the plans and specifications which he has contracted to follow” (Ryan v Feeney & Sheehan Bldg. Co., 239 NY 43, 46 [1924]; see Gee v City of New York, 304 AD2d 615, 616 [2003]). Thus, a contractor who performs its work in accordance with contract plans may not be held liable unless those plans are “so patently defective as to place a contractor of ordinary prudence on notice that the project, if completed according to the plans, is potentially dangerous” (West v City of Troy, 231 AD2d 825, 826 [1996]; see Ryan v Feeney & Sheehan Bldg. Co., 239 NY at 46; Gee v City of New York, 304 AD2d at 616; Stevens v Bast Hatfield, Inc., 226 AD2d 981 [1996]; Morriseau v Rifenburg Constr., 223 AD2d 981, 982 [1996]). Here, F.D. Contracting made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment by submitting evidentiary proof that it properly relied upon contract plans provided by the Village’s engineer in installing the subject brickwork (see Lacy v New York City Hous. Auth., 4 AD3d 455, 456 [2004]; Gee v City of New York, 304 AD3d at 616; Stevens v Bast Hatfield, Inc., 226 AD2d at 982). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable
The Supreme Court properly granted McCourt’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. “Generally, liability for injuries sustained as a result of negligent maintenance of or the existence of dangerous and defective conditions to public sidewalks is placed on the municipality and not the abutting landowner” (Hausser v Giunta, 88 NY2d 449, 452-453 [1996]). Although the Code of the Village of Farmingdale § 81-3.1 imposes a duty upon adjoining landowners to repair and maintain Village sidewalks, the court correctly determined that the brickwork area where the plaintiff fell, which contains trees and tree wells, is not a “sidewalk” within the meaning of the ordinance (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 144; Vucetovic v Epsom Downs, Inc., 10 NY3d 517 [2008]). Accordingly, McCourt had no duty to maintain and repair the brickwork. Mastro, J.P., Florio, Eng and Chambers, JJ., concur. [See 2008 NY Slip Op 30434(U).]
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.