People v. Perkins
Opinion of the Court
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (Herrick, J.), rendered January 26, 2006, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of robbery in the second degree (two counts), burglary in the second degree (two counts), criminal use of a firearm in the second degree and resisting arrest.
At the joint trial of defendant and Pinto, County Court dismissed three charges against defendant and ultimately found him guilty of the remaining charges.
We turn first to defendant’s contention that County Court abused its discretion by imposing an insufficient sanction for the People’s violation of Penal Law § 450.10 in releasing the cellular phone to one of the victims. When allegedly stolen property is in the custody of the police or a district attorney and is released before both the People and defense counsel have had an opportunity to examine, test and otherwise make use of it, Penal Law § 450.10 (10) mandates the imposition of a sanction (see People v Kelly, 62 NY2d 516, 520-521 [1984]). The choice of sanction, however, is “committed to the sound discretion of the
Defendant also contends that his conviction on the two robbery counts was against the weight of the evidence because there could be no motive for stealing a cellular phone which would be rendered useless when the owner canceled its service. Suffice it to say that the motive for removal of the phone from the victim may well have been to prevent her from immediately contacting the police. After viewing the evidence in a neutral light and giving “appropriate deference to the jury’s superior opportunity to assess the witnesses’ credibility” (People v Gilliam, 36 AD3d 1151, 1152-1153 [2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 946 [2007]), we conclude that the verdict was in accord with the weight of the evidence.
We further find no merit in defendant’s argument that the imposition of consecutive sentences was illegal. County Court properly imposed consecutive sentences upon defendant because the crimes of robbery in the second degree and burglary in the second degree are distinct and arose from the separate acts of the forcible taking of the victim’s cellular phone and entering the victim’s home with the intent to commit a crime (see People v Yong Yun Lee, 92 NY2d 987, 988-989 [1998]). Nor is the 28-year aggregate sentence harsh and excessive here, given the violent and terrifying nature of the crimes committed, the fact that defendant instigated this home invasion, and his lack of remorse. We perceive neither an abuse of discretion nor the existence of any extraordinary circumstances warranting a reduction of the sentence in the interest of justice (see People v Morgan, 24 AD3d 950, 954 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 815 [2006]; People v Jackson, 2 AD3d 893, 897 [2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 629 [2004]; People v Torra, 309 AD2d 1074, 1076 [2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 581 [2003]).
Defendant’s remaining contentions raised in his supplemental pro se brief have been reviewed and found to be without merit.
Cardona, P.J., Carpinello, Kane and Kavanagh, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The jury found Pinto guilty of burglary in the second degree (two counts), robbery in the second degree (two counts) and criminal use of a firearm in the second degree (People v Pinto, 56 AD3d 956 [2008] [decided herewith]).
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.