Gamiel v. Curtis & Reiss-Curtis
Opinion of the Court
A prior motion by defendants for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was granted on default; a motion by plaintiff to vacate the default was denied on the ground that plaintiff failed to show a meritorious cause of action; on appeal, this Court modified to the extent of reinstating the sixth and seventh causes of action for overbilling and improper retention of the file in the underlying action, finding that “plaintiff sufficiently set forth the merit of [these] claims ... to preclude summary resolution of those claims (44 AD3d 327, 328 [2007], lv dismissed 9 NY3d 1016 [2008], 10 NY3d 789 [2008], citing Batra v Office Furniture Serv., 275 AD2d 229 [2000]). The motion court, in denying defendants’ subsequent motion for summary judgment dismissing the remaining sixth and seventh causes of action and awarding judgment on their counterclaim for account stated, construed our prior order as a substantive ruling on defendants’ prior motion for summary judgment, stating that “[h]ad the Appellate Division wished for the Supreme Court to decide defendants’ summary judgment motion [with respect to the sixth and seventh causes of action], it would have remanded the matter for consideration [there] of ’ (citing, inter alia, Carrillo v New York City Tr. Auth., 39 AD3d 296, 297 [2007]). This misconstrued our prior order, which reinstated plaintiffs sixth and seventh causes of action under the lesser standard of proof for vacating a default, and was not meant to preclude a future motion for summary judgment by defendants (cf. Batra, 275 AD2d 229, 231 [2000]; see e.g. Embraer Fin. Ltd. v Servicios Aereos Profesionales, S.A., 42 AD3d 380 [2007]).
On the merits, defendants adduce evidence, unrebutted by plaintiff, sufficient to show that plaintiff received, retained without objection, and partially paid invoices without protest, warranting summary judgment on their counterclaim for ac
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.