Gahagan v. Gahagan
Opinion of the Court
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Gartenstein, J.H.O.), entered April 30, 2009, as, upon a decision of the same court dated October 29, 2008, made after a nonjury trial, (a) awarded monthly maintenance to the defendant in the sum of $4,533, (b) directed him to pay monthly carrying costs for the marital residence in the sum of $10,467, and (c) awarded the defendant exclusive occupancy of the marital residence, with all three of these awards to continue, in effect, until the last of the parties’ children reaches her majority or is sooner emancipated, (d) awarded the defendant annual child support in the sum of $24,800, (e) awarded the defendant an attorney’s fee, and (f) equitably distributed the marital property.
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, on the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, (1) by deleting from the third and fifth decretal paragraphs thereof the provisions directing, in effect, that the awards shall continue until the last of the parties’ children reaches her majority or is sooner emancipated, and substituting therefor provisions directing that those awards shall continue until December 31st of the year in which the par
The parties were married in 1986 and have four daughters: the oldest, Katherine, born xxx/xx/1994; Elaine, born xxx/xx/ 1995; Elizabeth, born xxx/xx/1997; and Allaire, born xxx/xx/ 1998. The plaintiff commenced this matrimonial action on January 15, 2003. At the time of the trial in May 2008, Katherine was in the eighth grade, Elaine was in the seventh grade, Elizabeth was in the fifth grade, and Allaire was in the fourth grade, all attending a private school.
The parties’ issues as to custody and visitation were settled by a so-ordered stipulation dated May 10, 2006, in which the defendant was awarded residential custody with liberal visitation to the plaintiff. The remaining issues as to finances were tried before Judicial Hearing Officer Stanley Gartenstein, resulting in the judgment appealed from.
The parties have enjoyed a relatively lavish lifestyle during
The initial award of maintenance, as well as the award to the defendant of the exclusive occupancy of the marital residence and the direction to the plaintiff that he pay all the carrying costs for the marital residence, in effect, until at the latest, the marital residence was sold, was a provident exercise of discretion (see Hathaway v Hathaway, 16 AD3d 458, 460 [2005]; Friedman v Friedman, 309 AD2d 830 [2003]; Maggi v Maggi, 303 AD2d 650 [2003]; see also Shurka v Shurka, 68 AD3d 488 [2009]; Warshaw v Warshaw, 169 AD2d 408 [1991]). However, under the circumstances of this case, it was an improvident exercise of discretion to delay the sale of the marital residence until the parties’ youngest child reaches her majority or is sooner emancipated. Instead, an appropriate point to balance the disruption that a move will inevitably cause with the financial needs of the parties is to direct that the marital residence be sold by December 31st of the year the parties’ second oldest daughter, Elaine, graduates from high school. At that time, the two oldest children should have graduated from high school and the two youngest children will have at least graduated from grammar school. Therefore, a sale at that point would appropriately balance “the need of the custodial parent to occupy the marital residence . . . against the financial need of the parties” (Goldblum v Goldblum, 301 AD2d 567, 568 [2003]; see Wortman v Wortman, 11 AD3d 604, 606 [2004]; Graziano v Graziano, 285 AD2d 488 [2001]; Waldmann v Waldmann, 231 AD2d 710, 711 [1996]). Furthermore, a more appropriate distribution of the net proceeds of the sale would be 60% to the defendant and 40% to the plaintiff, if the defendant fully cooperates in effectuating the sale. If not, the distribution of the net proceeds shall be split equally. In either instance, the defendant will remain obligated to pay the sum of $84,854 to the plaintiff from her share of the net proceeds for her failure to cooperate with regard to the filing of a prior tax return.
Additionally, after the sale of the marital residence, the child support payable by the plaintiff must also be adjusted to reflect the fact that a portion of the prior payment for housing costs was, in effect, child support. Accordingly, after the sale of the marital residence, the plaintiff must pay the defendant child support in accordance with the Child Support Standards Act (Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b]). If the parties cannot agree as to what the proper amount of child support required thereunder is, either or both of them may apply to the appropriate court for the recalculation of that obligation. We note that the Supreme and Family Court retain concurrent jurisdiction in this matter.
We also note that, by the terms of the seventh decretal paragraph of the judgment of divorce, the plaintiff still remains responsible for payment of 100% of various expenses of the children including, inter alia, their tuition through college. That also includes, among other things, payment of room and board, and other college expenses.
The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit. Rivera, J.E, Florio, Miller and Austin, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.