In re Erica D.
Cases that cite this one
10 later published cases cite this decision.
- Matter of Edward E. M. (Edward M.) (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2023)
- Matter of Noel R. (LaQueenia S.) (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2018)
- Matter of Chigusa Hosono D. v. Jason George D. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- In re Khadijah Destiny H. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- In re Khadijah Destiny H. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- In re Crystal P. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- In re Kasey D. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- In re Kasey D. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- In re Hailey JJ. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- In re Shae Tylasia I.M. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that respondent is presently and for the foreseeable future unable, by reason of mental retardation, to provide proper and adequate care for the subject child, who was diagnosed with Down’s syndrome. Testing by a senior psychologist employed by the Family Court, indicated that respondent’s full scale IQ was 48, which the expert characterized as “extremely low.” The director of the Family Court Mental Health Services opined, after interviewing respondent and reviewing her records, that she was of “subaverage intellectual functioning with impairment in adaptive behavior.” He stated that if the child were returned to her care, the child would be in danger of becoming a neglected child, now and for the foreseeable future. This evidence was sufficient to satisfy the statutory standard (see Social Services Law § 384-b [4] [c]; Matter of Joyce T., 65 NY2d 39, 50 [1985]).
The mother contends that her due process rights were violated by limitations the court placed on the testimony of lay witnesses concerning her ability to care for her other child and on broad based generalized anecdotal evidence. However, this claim is raised for the first time on appeal, and is unpreserved (see Matter of Kimberly Carolyn J., 37 AD3d 174, 175 [2007], lv dismissed 8 NY3d 968 [2007]).
On the merits, the court properly excluded irrelevant testimony and evidence. Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Sweeny, Catterson, Renwick and DeGrasse, JJ.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.