Credit Suisse First Boston v. Utrecht-America Finance Co.
Cases that cite this one
27 later published cases cite this decision. The 24 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Farias v. Simon (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- Crossing Park Properties, LLC v. Archer Capital Fund, L.P. (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)
- Places in Saratoga, LLC v. Izzo (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2026)
- Roberts v. Weight Watchers International, Inc. (2d Cir. 2017)
- Talk Radio Network Enterprises v. Cumulus Media Inc. (District Court, D. Oregon 2017)
- Roberts v. Weight Watchers International, Inc. (District Court, S.D. New York 2016)
- In re Cablevision Consumer Litigation (District Court, E.D. New York 2012)
- RDF Agent, LLC v. Electric Red Ventures, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2024)
- Doctors Allergy Formula, LLC v. Valeant Pharms. Intl. (New York Supreme Court 2023)
- LOGAN GENERATING COMPANY, L.P. v. DANN MARINE TOWING, LC (District Court, D. New Jersey 2023)
- Meisels v. Meisels (District Court, E.D. New York 2021)
- Advanced Water Technologies Inc. v. Amiad U.S.A., Inc. (District Court, S.D. New York 2020)
- S.A. De Obras y Servicios, COPASA v. Bank of Nova Scotia (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2019)
- Age Group, Ltd. v. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2018)
- Bank of America, N.A. v. Rausher (New York Supreme Court 2014)
- Nemon Corp. v. 45-51 Avenue B, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- Nemon Corp. v. 45-51 Avenue B, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Rodriguez (New York Supreme Court 2013)
- Bizjak v. Gramercy Capital Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Balestriere PLLC v. BanxCorp (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Balestriere PLLC v. BanxCorp (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Foundry Capital Sarl v. International Value Advisers, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Foundry Capital Sarl v. International Value Advisers, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- IDT Corp. v. Tyco Group, S.A.R.L. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen Bransten, J.), entered February 3, 2010, which, to the extent appealed from, partially granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on its first cause of action and declined to search the record to dismiss the second and fourth causes of action, unanimously reversed, on the law, plaintiffs motion denied and the second and fourth causes of action dismissed, with costs.
This action for breach of contract arises out of defendant Utrecht-America’s oral agreement (made through its agent, defendant Rabobank) to sell distressed assets to plaintiff (the trade) consisting of defendant’s interest in a May 28, 1999 loan to nonparty Choctaw Investors B.V, a Dutch limited liability company, for 62.5 cents on the dollar. As a special financing vehicle for Enron Corporation, Choctaw included among the significant intangible assets securing the loan its rights to a letter of indemnity provided by Enron, then involved in bankruptcy proceedings. On November 5, 2003, plaintiff sent written confirmation of the trade subject to the standard terms and conditions for distressed trade confirmations published by the Loan Syndications and Trading Association, Inc. (LSTA), which include the parties’ representations that each has independently ascertained the obligor’s business and financial condition and that, irrespective of information that may have come into possession of the other party, has decided to enter into the transac
The confirmation specified that the trade would be subject to credit documentation, and by November 17, 2003, plaintiff’s counsel had received the closing documents for the Choctaw loan. Several days later, plaintiff learned that Choctaw had been dissolved. Negotiations dragged on through December and into January as plaintiff sought to ascertain whether the transfer of the Choctaw collateral to the collateral agent, JP Morgan Chase (Chase), was effective under Dutch law. On the morning of January 14, 2004, defendant’s attorney was informed that plaintiff was “ready to move forward on its purchase from Utrecht.” However, that very afternoon, defendant sent a letter to plaintiff terminating the agreement due to plaintiffs failure to consummate the purchase, and Rabobank, as defendant’s agent, determined to terminate the trade.
On January 21, 2004, it was announced that a settlement had been reached between the various lenders to Choctaw and the Enron bankruptcy estate, a development that had the effect of substantially increasing the value of the Choctaw assets. Within the week, defendant reached an agreement with third parties for the transfer of its interest in the Choctaw loan at a price above par, and in early February, plaintiff bought additional Choctaw debt to effect cover of the terminated trade with Utrecht-America.
Plaintiff commenced this action for breach of contract against Utrecht-America and Rabobank, respectively (causes of action one and two), including breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (causes of action three and four). Following discovery, the parties agreed that Rabobank would “satisfy and guarantee payment of any final unappealable judgment against . . . Utrecht-America” and plaintiff would not pursue a claim based on the alleged status of Rabobank as Utrecht-America’s alter ego. Plaintiff thereafter brought this motion for summary judgment, excusing its delay in closing the trade on the need to complete documentation review, in particular, to resolve issues with respect to the collateral and to conform the representations and warranties in connection with the transfer to those contained in the original loan documents.
Defendants opposed the motion and moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211 [a]
There is a triable issue of fact as to whether plaintiff negotiated with Utrecht-America in good faith. This issue, “which necessitates examination of a state of mind, is not an issue which is readily determinable on a motion for summary judgment” (Coan v Estate of Chapin, 156 AD2d 318, 319 [1989]; see also Brookfield Indus. v Goldman, 87 AD2d 752, 753 [1982]; cf. IDT Corp. v Tyco Group, S.A.R.L., 13 NY3d 209, 214 [2009] [settlement agreement subject to good faith negotiation of further agreements]). Defendants’ expert, who may be called to testify concerning the practices of an industry (see AG Capital Funding Partners, L.P. v State St. Bank & Trust Co., 5 NY3d 582, 594 [2005]), opined that plaintiffs negotiations were inconsistent with those customary to the distressed debt market, and while the availability of a more prudent course of conduct does not preclude a party from demonstrating its good faith (see Polotti v Flemming, 277 F2d 864, 868 [2d Cir 1960]), it presents a factual issue for resolution at trial. At such time, the weight to be afforded to the expert opinion is within the province, of the trier of fact (see Rivera v City of New York, 212 AD2d 403, 404 [1995]).
We note that the obligation to negotiate in good faith “bar[s] a party from . . . insisting on conditions that do not conform to the preliminary agreement” (Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assn. of Am. v Tribune Co., 670 F Supp 491, 498 [SD NY 1987]). The parties having agreed to the terms and conditions promulgated by LSTA governing the confirmation, defendants were under no obligation to supply information sought by plaintiff in regard to Choctaw’s bankruptcy, much of which defendants produced
The duty of good faith and fair dealing is an implicit obligation imposed on the parties to a commercial transaction (see Dalton v Educational Testing Serv., 87 NY2d 384, 389 [1995]). The cause of action for breach of the duty merely duplicates the cause of action for breach of contract and was properly dismissed as redundant (e.g. Levi v Utica First Ins. Co., 12 AD3d 256, 257-258 [2004]) because a court, where appropriate, will enforce the obligation on contracting parties (see Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 304 [1983]).
As to plaintiffs claims based on Rabobank’s status as Utrecht-America’s alter ego, “[t]he party seeking to pierce the corporate veil must establish that the owners, through their domination, abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form to perpetrate a wrong or injustice against that party such that a court in equity will intervene” (Matter of Morris v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 82 NY2d 135, 142 [1993]). “An inference of abuse does not arise . . . where a corporation was formed for legal purposes or is engaged in legitimate business” (TNS Holdings v MKI Sec. Corp., 92 NY2d 335, 339-340 [1998]). It is undisputed that Rabobank was formed for legal purposes and was engaged in a legitimate business. Moreover, in an unappealed portion of the order under review, the court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against Rabobank because plaintiff failed to show that Rabobank used Utrecht-America “to commit fraud or malfeasance or other inequity.” In view of such finding, defendants’ request to dismiss the alter-ego claims against Rabobank should have been granted.
Finally, defendants’ contention that the motion court correctly found that the parties failed to enter into a fully binding preliminary agreement but, instead, entered into an agreement to negotiate in good faith is not cognizable. Defendants’ motion only sought dismissal of plaintiff’s third cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against Utrecht-America, and their contention is impermissibly raised for the. first time on appeal (see Recovery Consultants v Shih-Hsieh, 141 AD2d 272, 276 [1988]). In any event, an interpreta
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.