Rossrock Fund II, L.P. v. Osborne
Cases that cite this one
10 later published cases cite this decision.
- Stassa v. Stassa (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- Swedbank, AB v. Hale Avenue Borrower, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- CIT Bank, N.A. v. Donnatin (District Court, E.D. New York 2020)
- Wachovia Bank, National Ass'n v. Carcano (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- Wachovia Bank, National Ass'n v. Carcano (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- Washington Mutual Bank v. Valencia (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Citibank, N.A. v. Van Brunt Properties, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Osborne v. Rossrock Fund II, L.P. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Private Capital Group, LLC v. Hosseinipour (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Valley National Bank v. Deutsch (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
“[I]n moving for summary judgment in an action to foreclose a mortgage, a plaintiff establishes its case as a matter of law through the production of the mortgage, the unpaid note, and evidence of default” (Republic Natl. Bank of N.Y. v O’Kane, 308 AD2d 482 [2003] [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Village Bank v Wild Oaks Holding, 196 AD2d 812, 812 [1993]). Here, the plaintiff produced the notes and mortgages executed by, among others, the defendant George R. Osborne (hereinafter the appellant), as well as evidence of nonpayment. Accordingly, the plaintiff met its prima facie burden of demonstrating its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the complaint.
In response, the appellant failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to his defenses to the complaint (see Wells Fargo Bank Minn., N.A. v Perez, 41 AD3d 590 [2007]). The appellant’s contention that the statements and conduct of the plaintiffs predecessor constituted an oral waiver of the right to foreclose is belied by his own affidavit, in which he avers that he “understood that [the plaintiffs predecessor] could, on any given day, decide to begin foreclosure” (see generally Nassau Trust Co. v Montrose Concrete Prods. Corp., 56 NY2d 175, 184 [1982]; cf. Southold Sav. Bank v Cutino, 118 AD2d 555 [1986]). Moreover, the mortgage documents relating to the first mortgage contain a clause barring oral waivers (see City of New York v Grosfeld Realty Co., 173 AD2d 436 [1991]). Even had the plaintiffs predecessor orally waived its right to foreclose, “[a] waiver, . . . not being a binding agreement, can, to the extent that it is execu
The plaintiff demonstrated its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the appellant’s counterclaim by establishing that it did not modify or violate the loan documents. The appellant failed to raise a triable issue of fact in response.
The appellant’s remaining contentions are without merit. Skelos, J.E, Florio, Balkin and Leventhal, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.