Chappo & Co. v. Ion Geophysical Corp.
Opinion of the Court
The cause of action alleging fraud in the inducement is barred by the merger clause contained in the engagement letter (see Deerfield Communications Corp. v Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc., 68 NY2d 954, 956 [1986]; GoSmile, Inc. v Levine, 81 AD3d 77 [2010]). In any event, it is duplicative of the breach of contract cause of action (see Mañas v VMS Assoc., LLC, 53 AD3d 451, 453 [2008]).
The cause of action for breach of contract must be dismissed because plaintiff fails to allege its own performance under the contract or an actionable breach by defendant Ion (see Clearmont Prop., LLC v Eisner, 58 AD3d 1052, 1055 [2009]). Although plaintiff alleges that it found a lender, the documentary evidence shows that no terms had been finalized and that the loan amount was less than half the amount required by the engagement letter. As Ion was not required to pay plaintiff a fee until a lender had been secured, its nonpayment was not a breach of the agreement. In addition, the documentary evidence contradicts plaintiffs assertion of noncooperation by Ion. In any event, plaintiffs damages were limited to the $50,000 breakage fee, of which plaintiff is already in possession (see e.g. FCS Advisors, Inc. v Fair Fin. Co., Inc., 378 Fed Appx 65, 68 [2d Cir 2010] [break-up fee is form of liquidated damages]).
The cause of action for tortious interference with contract fails because it is unsupported by any factual allegations concerning the conduct of defendants Barclays and Icon. Plaintiff contends that it would be unfair to dismiss this claim before discovery, but “[it] will not be allowed to use pretrial discovery as a fishing expedition when [it] cannot set forth a reliable factual basis for what amounts to, at best, mere
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.