Fazio v. Costco Wholesale Corp.
Cases that cite this one
5 later published cases cite this decision.
- Adago v. Sy (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2026)
- Sampson v. Sarah Lawrence College (District Court, S.D. New York 2021)
- Wongsing v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust (District Court, S.D. New York 2021)
- Molinari v. 167 Housing Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- Molinari v. 167 Housing Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Paul G. Feinman, J.), entered October 21, 2010, which denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
We reject plaintiffs’ contention that the appeal is untimely because defendant filed its notice of appeal 32 days after it was served electronically with notice of the entry of the order (see CPLR 5513 [a]). A New York State Court Electronic Filing (NYSCEF) site confirmation shows the date on which the order with notice of entry was filed electronically and e-mail notifications were sent to counsel for the parties. However, the NYSCEF site’s transmission of notification of the entry to e-mail service addresses “shall not constitute service of notice of entry by any party” (22 NYCRR 202.5b [h] [3]). “A party shall serve notice of entry of an order ... on another party by serving a copy of the notification . . . and an express statement that the transmittal constitutes notice of entry” {id.). The only affidavit of service in the record shows that the notice of entry was served on defendant by mail. Thus, defendant had 35 days to notice its appeal (see CPLR 2103 [b] [2]).
The conclusion of defendant’s expert that the cracked and eroded area of concrete in defendant’s parking lot on which plaintiff Susan Fazio tripped was only one-sixteenth-inch deep and therefore did not create a tripping hazard was reasonably inferable from the photographs; no inspection was required to make a prima facie showing on that issue (see Matter of Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v Barile, 86 AD2d 362, 364-365 [1982]; see also Gaud v Markham, 307 AD2d 845 [2003]). However, “a mechanistic disposition of a case based exclusively on the dimension of the . . . defect is unacceptable” (Trincere v County of Suffolk, 90 NY2d 976, 977-978 [1997]). Plaintiff’s testimony that the concrete in the depressed area was eroded, broken up and uneven, with exposed, protruding stone creates an issue of fact whether the defect was trivial (see id. at 977; see e.g. Tese-Milner v 30 E. 85th St. Co., 60 AD3d 458 [2009]; George v New York City Tr. Auth., 306 AD2d 160 [2003]; Tineo v Parkchester S. Condominium, 304 AD2d 383, 383-384 [2003]; Argenio v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 277 AD2d 165, 166 [2000]).
Plaintiffs were not required to produce an expert to refute defendant’s expert’s conclusions (see e.g. Hendricks v Baksh, 46 AD3d 259 [2007]). Concur — Saxe, J.P, DeGrasse, Freedman, Abdus-Salaam and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.